Reset at Sea: US-NATO-Russian Cooperation in the Struggle against Piracy

Piracy has a long history and the struggle with it is closely tied to concepts of national sovereignty, freedom of the seas, and the protection of life and property at sea. In 1609, Hugo Grotius, (1583-1645), the great Dutch legal theorist, provided the legal foundation for making piracy unlawful. In his book, Mare Liberum (Free Ocean) he argued that the ocean belonged to no one state and all were free to use oceanic routes for trade or passenger traffic. Those who attacked shipping outside of a state of war between two sovereign states were no more than bandits at sea and subject to repression by any naval forces that came upon them. International law did recognize the right of warring states to conduct guerre de course (raids upon the opponent's merchant shipping by warships and armed merchantmen acting as privateers under a letter of marque and reprisal granted by his sovereign). By the mid-19th century, the European powers had agreed to abolish privateering, The US Constitution still lists issuing letters of marque and reprisal as part of the enumerated powers of congress. Yet, apart from unsuccessful efforts to persuade congress to issue letters of marque and reprisal in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, no modern application has been made. Instead, the civilized world has accepted the concept that piracy defined as robbery and illegal violence at sea is a threat to maritime commerce.

While piracy has persisted on the margins of world trade, the recent pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden have brought the problem back to global attention. Since 2005, the International Maritime Organization has called for efforts to combat piracy in this area. The fact that Somalia is a failed state torn apart by on-going civil war, set the stage for this 21st century piracy. A weak national government in Somalia, locked in an on-going struggle with opposing Islamic forces has been unable to establish de facto sovereignty over the rest of Somalia, while the autonomous province of Puntland has become the most important base for pirate operations along the coast. These pirates are not interested in seizing cargoes for disposition, but seek to hijack vessels and hold their crews for ransom, which is frequently paid out, making piracy big business.

In 2006 Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, which was composed of naval forces conducting counter-terrorism off the Horn of Africa, began anti-piracy operations from their base at Djibouti. Other countries joined the struggle. In June 2008, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution condemning piracy and robbery at sea and authorized the application of all means necessary to suppress such acts. These efforts sought to apply existing maritime law, international law, and national laws (which limits them to having jurisdiction over their own citizens), to deal with these attacks on merchant ships. The initial goal of naval operations against these pirates is to “deter and disrupt” their activities, to detain, interrogate, and disarm pirates. However, these actions would then culminate in the pirates' release. In the absence of an international tribunal to prosecute pirates, naval powers could not dissuade pirates (who did not face trial and punishment for their actions) from continuing their activities which continued to be profitable at low risk. In January 2009, the US provided the leadership to create CTF 151 as an international naval force to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. However, as a consequence of this legal gap, the number of pirate attacks in 2009 increased to 214 vessels with 47 being hijacked at sea. Russian naval forces began their own patrols to suppress piracy off the Horn of Africa in the fall of 2008 and have maintained a naval presence since then. Russian experts have written extensively on the problem of international maritime law and international relations (Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn’, No. 2, March 2009).

In July 2009 President, Dmitry Medvedev, proposed a solution: the creation of a separate international court to try cases of piracy (Nezavisimaia Gazeta, April 8, 2010). The response to this proposal was positive. In April of this year, the UN Security Council passed unanimously a Russian resolution calling on the UN Secretary General to provide “concrete” measures for the prosecution of pirates, including a special chamber at the national court of one of the countries in the region (RIA Novosti, April 27).

The background to the UN resolution involves increasing international frustration over the continuing pirate attacks, especially the hijacking of merchant ships, in the face of an international naval presence. The profile of Russian anti-piracy actions off the Horn of Africa increased in 2010 and took on an aspect of deeper international cooperation. On March 4, Krasnaia Zvezda announced that the Commander-in-Chief of Russian Naval Forces, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskii, discussed anti-piracy cooperation with the Chief of Staff of the French Navy, Admiral Pierre-François Forissier. The article went on to explore the global response to the threat of piracy and noted Russia’s ongoing commitment of naval forces to the task (Krasnaia Zvezda, March 4). On March 12, Russian warships involved in anti-piracy operations began formal cooperation with CTF 151 when the Russian ASW Frigate, Neustrashimy, from the Baltic Fleet met the USN destroyer, Farragut, off the Horn of Africa. The Russian captain of the Neustrashimy met with the Commander of CTF-151, Rear Admiral Bernard Miranda (USN), to discuss coordinating anti-piracy activities between Russian and CTF-151 naval forces (Krasnaia Zvezda, March 13). On the same day the Russian Rescue Tug, SB-36 from the Black Sea Fleet escorted the Thai fishing trawler, Union-3, when the vessel and its crew were freed from pirates off the Seychelles Islands after reportedly paying a $3 million ransom. Among the crew of the fishing trawler were 22 Russian seamen. The Union-3 had been seized in late October 2009 (Izvestia, March 9).

Russian naval activities in support of anti-piracy operations have increased in intensity and deepened in terms of international cooperation since March. On May 5, Somali pirates attacked and seized the Liberian-flagged and Russian owned tanker, Moscow University, in the Indian Ocean about 350 miles east of the Gulf of Aden. The ship’s crew was able to report the seizure, disable the ship’s engines, and lock themselves in the rudder compartment. A NATO helicopter located the hijacked ship, and the Russian cruiser, Marshal Shaposhnikov, raced to intercept the tanker early the following morning. The Somali pirates fired on the Marshal Shaposhnikov’s helicopter and its captain, certain of the crew’s safety, ordered his vessel to fire on the tanker and sent a boarding party of naval infantry to recapture it. In the ensuing fight one pirate was killed. The crew was rescued, and the ten remaining pirates disarmed, placed under arrest, and interrogated before being released to their boat. Since the vessel was sailing under a Liberian flag, Russia could not prosecute the captured pirates. The Staff of the Russian Pacific Fleet noted the assistance of the NATO helicopter in the operation and called the action a good example of international cooperation (Novaia Gazeta, Izvestia, May 7).

Evidence of deepening naval cooperation in the struggle against the Somali pirates was shortly forthcoming. On May 5, NATO Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, agreed to include Russia-NATO cooperation in the struggle against Somali pirates as part of a plan of military-to-military cooperation for 2010 (ARMS-TASS, May 5). During the same period President Medvedev signed a decree imposing an arms sales embargo on Somalia (Voenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, May 5-11).

Just over one week later the Marshal Shaposhnikov visited the port of Djibouti and the representative of the Djibouti navy announced that Russian warships involved in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden would be allowed to use that port as a base of operations (Vzgliad, May 17). On May 24 the Russia-NATO Council discussed cooperation in the struggle against Somali pirates (Kommersant, May 20). At the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Riga, Latvia, the Russian delegation composed of members of the State Duma had the usual issue of concerns to raise (Russian military doctrine, NATO’s expansion, the continuing dispute over the territorial integrity of Georgia). However, the Russian parliamentarians and their American counterparts found common ground for cooperation in the struggle against Somali pirates and the need to seek an international legal regime that would permit their trial upon capture (Biznes & Baltiia, June 1).

On June 2, local press in the Russian Far East reported that Russian merchant seamen were taking part in an international petition drive to persuade national governments to unite their efforts in the struggle against piracy (Vladivostok, June 2). On June 4, the Russian navy announced the deployment of a flotilla from the Pacific Fleet on a friendship visit to the US. The vessels, the cruiser Varyag, the rescue tug, Fotii Krilov, and the tanker, Boris Butoma, under the command of Rear Admiral Vladimir Kasatanov will visit San Francisco with the goal of developing “practical and friendly contacts between the Russian Navy and the US Navy.” In a review of Russian naval activities during this summer’s deployment season, the author of the article noted the continuing deployment of Russian warships off Somalia. The author noted: “The contribution of the Russian navy to the efforts of the international community in the struggle with pirates off the coasts of Somali is already highly appreciated by many influential international figures” (Krasnaia Zvezda, June 4). In this area of naval cooperation against a common threat to freedom of the seas, the US-NATO “reset” with Russia appears to be working because there are shared interests that override conflicts in other areas.

The NATO First Act Would Advance Transatlantic Security | The Heritage Foundation

The NATO First Act Would Advance Transatlantic Security | The Heritage Foundation

Football and peace

I believe football can help bringing people closer and leverage differences and misperceptions.

Watch the video on NATO review and take a look at some nice pictures from the past.

Dear friends,

I would like to share the latest edition of YATA Newsletter with you. You can find the latest edition from here:

www.atlantic-youth.org/documents/newsletters/NewsletterJune.pdf

All the best
Antti Talonen

Value to Big Powers May Not Save Kyrgyzstan

A year and a half ago, the world’s great powers were fighting like polecats over Kyrgyzstan, a landlocked stretch of mountains in the heart of Central Asia.

The United States was ferociously holding on to the Manas Air Base, a transit hub considered crucial toNATO efforts in Afghanistan. Russiawas so jealous of its traditional dominance in the region that it promised the Kyrgyz president $2.15 billion in aid the day he announced he was closing Manas. With the bidding war that followed, Kyrgyzstan could be forgiven for seeing itself as a global player.

And yet for the past week, as spasms of violence threatened to break Kyrgyzstan apart, its citizens saw their hopes for an international intervention flicker and die. With each day it has become clearer that none of Kyrgyzstan’s powerful allies — most pointedly, its former overlords in Moscow — were prepared to get involved in a quagmire.

Russia did send in several hundred paratroopers, but only to defend its air base at Kant. For the most part, the powers have evacuated their citizens, apparently content to wait for the conflict to burn itself out.

The calculus was a pragmatic one, made “without the smallest thought to the moral side of the question,” said Aleksei V. Vlasov, an expert in the politics of post-Soviet countries at Moscow State University.

“We use the phrase ‘collective responsibility,’ but in fact this is a case of collective irresponsibility,” he added. “While they were fighting about whatever — about bases, about Afghanistan — they forgot that in the south of Kyrgyzstan there was extreme danger. The city was flammable. All they needed to do was throw a match on it.” He referred to the city of Osh, which suffered days of ethnic rioting.

Kyrgyzstan might have unraveled anyway, but competition between Moscow and Washington certainly sped the process.

To lock in its claim on the base after the threat of expulsion, the United States offered President Kurmanbek S. Bakiyev $110 million to back out of his agreement with Russia, which had already paid him $450 million. Congratulating itself on its victory, Washington raised the stakes by announcing the construction of several military training facilities in Kyrgyzstan, including one in the south, which further irritated Moscow.

This spring, the Kremlin won back its lost ground, employing a range of soft-power tactics to undermine Mr. Bakiyev’s government. Mr. Bakiyev was ousted by a coalition of opposition leaders in April, and conditions in Kyrgyzstan’s south — still loyal to the old government — hurtled toward disaster.

“Let’s be honest, Kyrgyzstan is turning into a collapsing state, or at least part of it is, and what was partially responsible is this geopolitical tug of war we had,” said Alexander A. Cooley, who included Manas in a recent book about the politics of military bases. “In our attempts to secure these levers of influence and support the governing regime, we destabilized these state institutions. We are part of that dynamic.”

Last week, as pillars of smoke rose off Osh and Jalal-Abad, citizens begged for third-party peacekeepers to replace local forces they suspected of having taken part in the violence.

Roza Otunbayeva, the head of Kyrgyzstan’s interim government, asked Moscow for peacekeepers, and when that request was denied, for troops to protect strategic sites like power plants and reservoirs. She asked Washington to contribute armored vehicles from the base at Manas, which she said would be used to transport the dead and wounded, she told the Russian newspaper Kommersant.

So far, Moscow and Washington have responded mostly with humanitarian aid pledges — late on Friday, Russia’s Defense Ministry said that Ms. Otunbayeva’s request was still under consideration.

The United States, overextended in Afghanistan and Iraq, has neither the appetite nor the motivation for a new commitment. Russia, the more obvious player, sees the risks of a deployment outweighing the benefits. Russian troops would enter hostile territory in south Kyrgyzstan, where Mr. Bakiyev’s supporters blame Moscow for his overthrow, and Uzbekistan could also revolt against a Russian presence.

Mr. Vlasov, of Moscow State University, said: “Who are we separating? Uzbeks from Kyrgyz? Krygyz from Kyrgyz? Kyrgyz from some criminal element? There is no clearly defined cause of this conflict. It would be comparable to the decision the Soviet Politburo made to invade Afghanistan — badly thought through, not confirmed by the necessary analytical work.”

If the explosion of violence was a test case for the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an eight-year-old post-Soviet security group dominated by Russia, it seems to have failed, its leaders unwilling to intervene in a domestic standoff. In any case, neither the Russian public nor the county’s foreign policy establishment is pressing the Kremlin to risk sending peacekeepers.

“If you send them, you have to shoot sooner or later,” said Sergei A. Karaganov, a prominent political scientist in Moscow. “Then you are not a peacekeeper, but something else.”

Though it seems that the worst of the violence has passed, great challenges remain. Beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis is an unstable state at the heart of a dangerous region. The Ferghana Valley, bordering Afghanistan, is a minefield of religious fundamentalism, drug trafficking and ethnic hatreds.

If Kyrgyz-style violence should radiate across borders in Central Asia, the result could be a rise in Islamic militancy that would directly threaten Russia and the United States.

The failure of international institutions last week should alarm both capitals. President Obama and President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia began their relationship with the crisis over the Manas base, and as they grope toward tentative collaboration in the post-Soviet space, Kyrgyzstan has dominated their conversation.

Now, Kyrgyzstan needs help building a stable government that knits together the north and the south. Dmitri V. Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, suggested that NATO should be working with the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to develop a mechanism for collective action. The next time a Central Asian country is wobbling at the edge of a precipice, he said, someone must be prepared to accept responsibility.

“You can abstain from a local conflict in Kyrgyzstan,” Mr. Trenin said. “You can close your eyes to it — it’s bad for your conscience — but you can live with it. If something happens in Uzbekistan, you will not be able to just let it burn out.”

Invitation - 15h Portuguese Atlantic Youth Seminar

Dear Esteemed Friends and Colleagues,

The Portuguese Atlantic Committee and the Portuguese Atlantic Youth Association have the immense pleasure of inviting your association to participate in this year's Portuguese Atlantic Youth Seminar (PAYS), which will be held for the fifteenth consecutive year.

This year the Seminar will be held at Sintra Air Base, near Lisbon, from the 24th (arrival) to the 31st of July (departure), under the general theme “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: road to Lisbon”.

In order to apply, get in contact with your National Chapter or contact us at secretariadoajpa@gmail.com

We look forward to hearing from you

Hungarian Prime Minister, Secretary General discuss Afghanistan, Kosovo and NATO’s future

On 3 June, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán visited NATO Headquarters, where he met with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to discuss NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan and Kosovo. They also discussed the upcoming Summit in Portugal, at which Allies will agree on a new Strategic Concept for NATO.

In speaking to the press after their meeting, the Secretary General congratulated the Prime Minister for his recent electoral victory and said he looked forward to cooperating with him and his government. He also expressed appreciation for Hungary’s contribution to NATO’s operations in Kosovo as well as in Afghanistan, where he said the country is “pulling its weight” despite tough financial times.

Mr Fogh Rasmussen also stressed the importance of Hungary’s hosting of NATO’s C17 transport aircraft, which he said was a “concrete demonstration of what we can do when Allies pool together their resources.” The aircraft can be used for missions as well as humanitarian airlift or disaster relief operations if called on.

The two also discussed Kosovo and the western Balkans, where the Secretary General said “there are many encouraging signs” and that “Kosovo is moving in the right direction”. “Euro-Atlantic integration for all countries in the Balkans must be the aim,” he added.

In speaking about NATO’s future, Mr Fogh Rasmussen said that territorial defence for member countries would remain a core function of the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept. “However, we also have to realize that in order to protect our people effectively, we need to adapt to the new security challenges of our century, like terrorism, cyber attacks [and] missile attacks.”

Prime Minister Orbán for his part said that Hungary is a very committed member of the Alliance and that the transatlantic cooperation NATO represents is a “cornerstone” of his country’s security.

On Afghanistan, he said the mission there has to conclude successfully to demonstrate NATO’s effectiveness as a leading organization in today’s world.

And in referring to NATO's future, the Prime Minister said: "Hungary would remain part of the common thinking on the future security and collective defence strategy of NATO."

Russia denounces U.S. missile move

Russia has denounced the deployment of U.S. Patriot missiles in Poland as detrimental to regional security and trust.

“Such military activity does not help to strengthen our mutual security, to develop relations of trust and predictability in this region,” said the Foreign Ministry in a statement carried by the Itar-Tass news agency.

A battery of U.S. Patriot air defence missiles, to be manned by up to 150 U.S. troops, arrived on Sunday in Morag, a small town in north-eastern Poland just 60 km from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.

“We have stated more than once that we do not understand the logic and focus of cooperation between the U.S. and Poland in this sphere,” said the statement.

It is the first deployment of U.S. surface-to-air missiles so close to Russia's borders.

The missiles will be able to shoot down aircraft and missiles over the entire Kaliningrad region, according to Russia's NATO envoy Dmitry Rogozin.

Temporary deployment

Moscow said its questions to Washington and Warsaw had gone unanswered, as had its request to move the missile site farther from the Russian border. The Pentagon said the main purpose of the temporary deployment is to teach the Polish military to operate the advanced guided missile system.

However, in 2012 the Patriot base will become permanent.

Under President Barack Obama's reconfigured missile defence plan for Europe, Poland is also expected by 2018 to host SM-3 missile interceptors capable of shooting down Russian ballistic missiles.

NATO's Center of Gravity: Political Will

Jorge Benitez: If NATO starts to lose the battle for the political will of its people, it will slowly fade into history. A major public diplomacy effort is needed to convince the democratic constituencies in NATO countries of the alliance’s salience. This is essential to the funding of military efforts in difficult economic times.

NATO must launch a major public diplomacy effort in order to reach out in a concerted effort to the Alliance’s members’ constituencies. More solidarity among NATO members is needed for the Alliance to muster the political will necessary to overcome the external and internal threats to its success in Afghanistan. The issue is crucial to the Alliance’s survival.

In a salient presentation at the Atlantic Council, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral James Stavridis, revealed a promising strategy for victory in Afghanistan. He stressed that the Afghan people are key to its resolution and need to be regarded as a center of gravity in the conflict. While the Admiral is absolutely correct, he still misses a decisive point; namely, that the people who constitute the NATO Alliance represent a center of gravity as well.

According to the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, a center of gravity is "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends" and "the point against which all our energies should be directed." While useful in offensive terms, Clausewitz failed to remind us to protect our own (defensive) center of gravity from the enemy's attack. Thus, although Admiral Stavridis correctly identified the offensive center of gravity in this conflict (depriving the al Qaeda/Taliban alliance of the support of the Afghan people), he ignored its defensive counterpart.

NATO urgently needs to protect its own center of gravity: the support of its people for the Alliance. If NATO loses the political will of the people in its member states, it will not be able to execute SACEUR's strategy and will never have the time to gain the lasting support of the Afghan people. The 2004 Madrid train bombings provide a striking example of how dangerous the lack of public support is to NATO’s mission. The bombings demonstrated that the enemy can influence public opinion and produce regime change, without ever needing to invade a NATO member country or occupying one of its national capitals.

Under the leadership of Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO has made an effort to build the political will within its member states through public diplomacy. The report by the Group of Experts highlighted the need for improvement in this area. "NATO populations should be reminded that the Alliance serves their interests through the security it provides." While such emphasis is a step forward, it is hardly sufficient. NATO needs to invest the same amount of energy and attention to reinforcing its defensive center of gravity (popular support for NATO in member countries) as it is dedicating to the offensive center of gravity (winning the support of the Afghan people).

For NATO to succeed, it is simply not enough to focus on educating leaders in national capitals. All of NATO's members are democracies, and thus it is crucial to invest time and effort into conveying NATO's message to the public at large. Until the Alliance does a better job of informing the general electorate of NATO’s value, it will unwittingly allow for the rise of leaders and governments that will choose parochial interests over the benefits of the transatlantic partnership.

Public diplomacy is not an option in an alliance of democracies, it is essential. Key alliance decisions are made, sanctioned, and funded by national legislatures that pay far more attention to public opinion than to strategy seminars. NATO needs to inform the public about the very real risks to each member's welfare and stress the Alliance's contributions to their protection and prosperity.

An uninformed public may tolerate providing the resources for a vaguely benign international organization and military force in good economic times. But in times of economic crisis, voters will not support political leaders who are perceived to be wasting scarce national resources on opaque efforts beyond the nation’s borders. Voters are even more averse to sacrificing the lives of their children in conflicts that appear distant and non-threatening.

Gen. David Petreus is beginning to win the conflict in Iraq because he understands that "the human terrain is the decisive terrain." If NATO starts to lose the battle for the political will of its people, it will slowly become a hollow alliance, comprised primarily of many bureaucrats and a few warriors. In time, it will follow the WEU into the dustbin of history. If we allow that to happen, we will unsuspectingly put ourselves in great peril.

Ukraine Is Not Yet 'Lost'

Sacha Tessier-Stall and Kateryna Zarembo who are analysts at the International Center for Policy Studies in Kiev wrote to New York Times on the issue of Western-Russian-Ukraine triangle ...

Doom-sayers have been lamenting the West’s imminent “loss” of Ukraine for years, and the trend has only picked up since Viktor Yanukovich was elected president in February. In the recent signing of an agreement prolonging the lease of a Russian naval base in Crimea, they see proof of the new president’s desire to cement his country’s status as a Russian satellite.

They’re wrong. Sort of.

True, it’s a bad deal. In exchange for rebates on natural gas until 2019, President Yanukovich has allowed Moscow to station its Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sevastopol until 2042. In doing so, he has allowed Russia to maintain a foothold in a particularly unstable part of Ukraine — Crimea — and to continue to project its military power in the volatile Black Sea region — not a minor development, especially after Russia and neighbor Georgia came to blows in August 2008.

Just as worrying, the rebates will allow the president to postpone reform of Ukraine’s famously corrupt and inefficient energy sector. They are life support for a fossilized system that should long have gone the way of the dinosaurs.

Putting off reform is politically profitable for Mr. Yanukovich, who depends on the support of industrial and energy barons who made their fortunes thanks to corruption and artificially cheap gas. But it comes at a high political cost to Ukraine, which now essentially depends on Russian subsidies to pay for the energy it consumes.

In other words, the deal bolsters Russia’s influence in Ukraine and its claim to a sphere of influence in the region.

But those who see it as evidence of Mr. Yanukovich’s determination to steer his country back into Russia’s orbit are not looking at the right things.

The agreement is less evidence of Mr. Yanukovich’s geopolitical inclinations than proof of his country’s weakness. Ukraine’s economy shrank by one seventh in 2009, and with it the government’s ability to pay its energy bills.

Even Yulia Tymoshenko, a leader of the Orange Revolution who as recently as 2008 had called for Ukraine to join NATO, as prime minister found herself compelled in 2009 to make important concessions to Moscow — including a gas accord so one-sided it had to be revised only a few months after its signing.

Nor, for all its repercussions, does the deal spell the end of European integration in the broader sense. While NATO membership is clearly off the table in the short and probably medium terms, that was evident already before Mr. Yanukovich came to power.

The new president has resisted attempts by Moscow to get Ukraine to join a Russia-led customs union, preferring instead to continue negotiations on a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union.

He has described European integration as his “key priority,” symbolically making his first visit as president to Brussels — much to Moscow’s ire. Mr. Yanukovich is less Western-oriented than his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko, but he is not a Kremlin stooge.

Despite his reputation for incompetence, Yanukovich can be a smooth operator. The gas agreement may undermine Ukraine’s position vis-à-vis Russia, but it is popular with industry and many households, whom it saves from higher gas bills (for this year at least).

It also paves the way for a national budget acceptable to the I.M.F., whose deficit-reduction demands have been a major stumbling block in negotiations on the release of further tranches of its emergency loan. Even U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called it evidence of Ukraine’s new “balanced approach” to foreign policy.

More worrying than the agreement’s content is the deeply flawed way in which it was concluded — and what this says about Mr. Yanukovich’s attitude toward the rule of law in Ukraine.

The Constitution prohibits the basing of foreign military installations on Ukrainian territory, albeit in unclear terms. What’s more, the deal was never submitted to Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, as it should have been, and the normal parliamentary ratification procedure was not respected. This, combined with the constitutionally dubious way in which Mr. Yanukovich recently pieced together his parliamentary majority, raises serious questions about his willingness to play by the rules.

It is too early to say that President Yanukovich is intentionally helping Russia “steal” Ukraine from the West. He is more positively inclined toward Moscow than his predecessor, but the truth is that he has been pushed into a corner by a combination of geopolitical ineptness, special interests and pre-existing problems.

The real question is whether he takes his obligations (constitutional and otherwise) seriously. If he doesn’t, both the West and Russia are in for unpleasant surprises.

Did Kim Jong Il order the torpedo strike?

Which interpretation of the (not-so-shocking) news that North Korea sank a South Korean warship is more troubling: that Kim Jong Il ordered the torpedo strike, or that he didn't?

Ruediger Frank, a North Korea expert at the University of Vienna, says it's the latter:

The “cornered tiger” scenario is the only condition, beyond mental illness, under which Kim Jong Il would choose this option. One possible interpretation of the sinking of the Cheonan is that the situation in North Korea is so bad and the regime so desperate that it believes risking annihilation is its only option. But while it is hard to regard the situation in North Korea as rosy, it has been through worse times. With the currency reforms of 2009, the regime was able to win some time in its otherwise hopeless fight against the inevitable transformation of North Korea’s society when it expropriated the growing wealth from the newly emerging middle class and tried to partially demonetize the economy again. And as far as we know, prior to March 26, there was no intelligence pointing to unusual troop movements; no increase in communications that might have signaled something out of the ordinary was about to happen or signs that a change in the military’s alert status was about to take place.

Of all the possible scenarios for why North Korea would have been involved in the Cheonan incident, the one that should worry us the most is the possibility that it was NOT Kim Jong Il who gave the orders. While in 2008 one could have imagined, under certain circumstances, that a young recruit overreacted and shot a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang, it is much less likely that the captain of a North Korean submarine had a short fuse and sank that corvette. He must have done so upon receiving orders, or at least a “go ahead” from someone above him. The higher up we move in the command chain, the stress motive becomes less likely. A lieutenant commander in his sub might think twice; a rear admiral will think ten times before pulling the trigger.

If the North Koreans torpedoed the ship, and if it was not done after a self-destructive order by Kim Jong Il, this may be proof of a destabilization of the current leadership in Pyongyang. Sinking the Cheonan without consent by the top leader would be an open act of insubordination. An autocratic leader who does not have his lieutenants under control becomes a liability to the system. It is fear and the unchallenged authority of the top that keeps an autocracy together. Many of us have argued that such considerations had allowed Kim Jong Il to take over power from his father so smoothly despite his very different personality: the elite knew that regime stability depended on a strong and undisputed leader, and he was the only realistic candidate for the job.

Yet, years have passed since 1994, and North Korea has changed substantially. A famine, a set of failed economic policies, and Kim’s obvious health issues have created a situation of frustration, insecurity, and nervousness. The Pyongyang elite will be holding their breath and watching closely how Kim Jong Il reacts. What if he does not succeed in creating the impression that sinking the Cheonan was his idea? Even if so, this is a catch-22 since it invites a potentially destructive counter reaction by South Korea and the United States. If it wasn’t done on his command, will Kim Jong Il conduct a major purge of the culprits like his father did in 1956, when a trip to Europe was used to launch a coup against him? If he doesn’t, then the vultures will get more courageous.

Frank worries most of all about a rapid and messy regime collapse, leading to "a humanitarian disaster, a last-ditch effort at a military solution, or the active involvement of superpowers like China."

There are clearly a lot of folks in the region who are also worried about this scenario. But it's worth noting that North Korea already is a humanitarian disaster. At some point, Kim Jong Il's regime is going to have to end before that situation changes. I don't see any signs that outside players, save perhaps China, have any hope of micromanaging some sort of smooth transition to a more decent government.

Advanced Research Workshop - "Perceptions of NATO: a balance 60 years after" (17 e 18 de Maio)

“Perceptions of NATO: a balance 60 years after”, directed by Luís Nuno Rodrigues (ISCTE-IUL e IPRI) and Volodymyr Dubovyk (Odessa N. University). This Advanced Research Workshop will provide an assessment of how NATO and its mission are perceived today in the world. This topic is particularly relevant when the Organization just completed 60 years of existence and is in a process of redifining its strategic concept. The ARW will evaluate how NATO is seen and perceived both in member countries and in countries that do not belong to the Organization. Special attention will be given to the younger generations, raised after the Cold War, and to the way they see NATO’s role, mission and utility in the 21st Century. (also here)

SIMOTAN V - Official Journal

For those who would like to take a glimpse at how SIMOTAN V developed from 5 to 8 May, please take a look at the Official Journal published here and here.

Ten Recommendations for David Cameron’s Administration

After 13 years of Labour government, Britain’s relationship with the European Union (EU) needs to be recalibrated. Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown presided over massive transfers of Britain’s sovereignty to the EU while denying the British people a referendum on important constitutional changes such as the Lisbon Treaty. The new British foreign secretary, William Hague, has stated that he will implement a “distinctively British foreign policy.”[1] The following 10 recommendations will allow Hague to fashion a more transatlantic-orientated approach to his government’s European policies:

1. Do Not Join the Euro

For EU elites determined to create a European superstate, a single European currency is the ultimate prize. However, the current economic crisis in Greece demonstrates the shortcomings of creating a political union without a sound economic foundation. Britain should not underwrite failing European economies, let alone provide the European Central Bank and the European Commission the power to set Britain’s interest rates and other economic policies by embracing the Euro.

2. Introduce a U.K. Sovereignty Bill and a Referendum Lock

At the last general election, all three major political parties promised the British people a referendum on the EU’s proposed constitution. In addition to providing such a “referendum lock,” a U.K. sovereignty bill would further affirm the authority of Parliament over the EU. In order to restore public trust in manifesto commitments, the sovereignty bill and referendum lock should be introduced in the first year of the new government.

3. Bring Back Britain’s Rebate

In 2005, Blair agreed to give up a portion of Britain’s rebate from the EU’s budget in exchange for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Through November 2009, this decision cost Britain €10.5 billion ($13.3 billion), and there has been no meaningful reform of the CAP.[2] French President Nicolas Sarkozy—whose country receives the largest portion of CAP payments—even shut Britain out of talks on the future of EU agricultural subsidies.[3] Prime Minister Cameron and Foreign Secretary Hague should follow in the footsteps of then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who first secured the British rebate in 1984, and restore Britain’s rebate.

4. Repatriate Policy Competences from the EU

It is estimated that EU social laws will cost Britain £71 billion ($105 billion) over the next 10 years.[4] Legislation such as the Working Time Directive has been damaging to Britain’s economy and will prove especially harmful as the government seeks to regain economic competiveness in the years ahead. The British government should therefore advance proposals to repatriate key policy areas from the EU’s regulatory juggernaut and subject any further provisions to their “referendum lock.”

5. Oppose a Unilateral Move to Raise EU Emissions Reduction Targets to 30 Percent

The EU pledged to increase its emissions reduction targets to 30 percent if an international agreement could be reached at Copenhagen in December 2009. Although the international climate change negotiations collapsed, the EU is now proposing to unilaterally pursue the 30 percent target at a cost of €81billion ($103 billion).[5]

6. Abolish the EU’s Parliamentary Sessions in Strasbourg

For one week per month, the European Parliament transfers its entire staff from Brussels to Strasbourg, where it holds monthly voting sessions. This travelling circus costs the European taxpayers around €200 million per year ($300 million) and wastes valuable time that could be better spent critically scrutinising EU legislation.

7. Maintain the Primacy of NATO in Europe’s Defense Architecture

NATO guarantees Britain’s security as well as that of its European and North American allies. Importantly, it ensures that Europe and America are able to collectively defend themselves in the event of an attack. It is critical, therefore, that NATO is not undermined by duplicate defense arrangements such as the European Security and Defense Policy, which will draw away critical resources and undercut NATO’s political solidarity.

8. Press Britain’s NATO Allies to More Fairly Share the Burden in Afghanistan

Britain and America are among a handful of nations disproportionately shouldering the burden of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. It is vital that Britain’s NATO partners step up to the plate by providing additional combat troops, equipment, and political support for the new counterinsurgency strategy to which it agreed last year. Britain should also press its European allies to spend NATO’s benchmark of 2 percent of their GDP on their national defense.

9. Put Defense at the Heart of National Security

The Liberal Democrats support the prioritization of climate change in Britain’s national security strategy. The next government should not redirect already scarce funds from security and defense priorities toward costly and unnecessary climate change measures. Britain’s national security strategy should focus on the clear and present dangers to the security of the U.K. and its allies including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.

10. Press the EU to Implement Targeted, Crippling Sanctions Against Iran

The United Nations has imposed three rounds of sanctions against Iran in an effort to convince Tehran to give up its illicit nuclear weapons program; it is highly unlikely that a fourth round of sanctions will change Tehran’s mind. The EU should therefore impose targeted and crippling sanctions on Iran—on top of the U.N. sanctions. Britain should lead Europe in imposing sanctions on energy imports, domestic oil refinery capacity, and international banking. Sanctions should also be brought against the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and companies affiliated with it.

Rediscovering Thatcher

In 1988, Margaret Thatcher laid out an Atlanticist vision for the future of Europe as an alternative to the relentless integration and centralization pursued by EU elites. The British government should revive this model and advance a strong transatlantic alliance, with the Anglo–American Special Relationship at its center.

Georgia's NATO Dream

If there was ever any doubt that of the NATO membership process being a political exercise, one needn’t look further than the Alliance’s decision to grant tiny, fractured Bosnia-Herzgovinia a Membership Action Plan on April 22 during the NATO gathering in Tallinn.

According to EUObserver, NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen marked Bosnia’s accession to the traditional integration pathway with caveats over the country’s readiness, underlining the divisions within the Alliance over the MAP.

“Last night Nato foreign ministers made an important decision to invite Bosnia and Herzegovina to join Membership Action Plan, but made clear that there are still important reform issues that need to be solved,” said Rasmussen (1). However, another NATO statement glossed over uncertainties.

“Bosnia and Herzegovina has made significant progress on reform,” said the NATO statement. “NATO foreign ministers welcome its decision on destruction of surplus ammunition and arms and its new ISAF contributions [soldiers in Afghanistan].”

Alliance disagreements notwithstanding, it’s now become only a matter of time before Bosnia joins the 27-member security pact, as no country to be awarded a MAP has ever been denied eventual entry. Naturally, however, the Tallinn decision also begs a question over NATO’s political priorities. Bosnia, for whatever its merits, can hardly be considered a more adequate candidate for NATO than Georgia, whose own ISAF contributions significantly outweigh that of Bosnia’s. Currently, nearly 1000 Georgian troops are engaged in both reconstruction and peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan with no national caveats. Bosnia has ten.

On broader measures, Georgia also does better. Though Bosnia and Georgia rank similarly according to Freedom House’s 2009 Freedom in the World index, at 4:3 and 4:4, respectively (lower is better), Georgia is far ahead according to the Heritage Institute’s 2010 Index of Economic Freedom (26th place to Bosnia’s 110th) and Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index (66th to Bosnia’s 99th) (2).

By any objective measure – both military and socio-economic – Georgia should have gotten a MAP long before Bosnia, which is arguably faces an equally, if not greater, challenging set of political circumstances borne from violence in the 1990s. Bosnia’s greatest advantage over Georgia, however, seems to be the comparative lack of patronage by Moscow to its own separatists. Though Russia has expressed support for the Serbian enclave in Bosnia, its geographic distance and relative obscurity on the Kremlin’s foreign policy agenda (compared to Georgia or even Serbia and Kosova) make Russia’s political investment in Bosnia a far lesser challenge to its application for a MAP. This is similarly true for Macedonia, which would have already achieved NATO membership were it not for a Greek veto over its name, or Albania, which has already joined the Alliance.

Though NATO representatives have in denied Russia’s influence in Georgia’s membership bid in the past, these counter-examples of NATO alignment by states showing, in many cases, even less progress than Georgia makes these denials dubious. Accordingly, it is long past time for NATO to acknowledge this reality for what it is rather than obscuring its true rationale with rhetoric about reform.

Still, among most foreign policy analysts, it’s no great secret that Georgia’s stalled proposal for NATO membership is being held captive by Moscow and, by proxy, the interests they command in Europe. Obviously, Georgia cannot accede to the Atlantic Alliance under the same standards as other countries.

Instead, Georgia’s unique position requires a different set of solutions. First, Georgia must continue to pursue meaningful reforms aggressively and consistently. Although there are many elements in Georgia’s political class – both in government and the opposition – that would prefer to slow, stop, or even reverse the trend in reforms, the chance for NATO accession will heavily rely on the quality and reach of Georgia’s reform process. In the 1990s, similar doubts clouded the case for the Baltic states’ applications to NATO, but the speed and thoroughness of reforms left no doubt of those countries’ readiness, and deservedness, for NATO membership. In other words, Georgia must be far and away better on every metric to earn realistic consideration, let alone join. This must go beyond the preachy pronouncements regularly aired by Georgian politicians about successful reforms, but rather should be reflected in such things as economic growth, peaceful and democratic transfers of power, a viable loyal opposition, and a truly free media.

Also, Georgia’s precarious defense situation vis-à-vis Russia simply must be resolved. Without a doubt, under present and foreseeable conditions, there is no appetite in NATO to accept a member that is constantly harassed by the specter of war with Russia. In some ways, this is something of a chicken-and-egg situation. Many Georgian policymakers regard NATO as the single best way to deter Russian aggression, yet NATO is unlikely to invite Georgia to the Alliance if it is perceived as a simmering crisis waiting to happen. This is not a conundrum that can be solved merely through good trade relations or even inordinate contributions to international peacekeeping efforts, but will require devising a strategy that will either persuade or compel Moscow to treat Tbilisi with greater respect for its territorial integrity and, more importantly, its foreign policy orientation.

In some quarters, this has translated into pushing for concessions to Moscow or even mortgaging Georgian sovereignty for greater leniency from the Kremlin. Putting aside the fact that such a policy would obviously negate NATO membership and defeat the purpose of Georgia’s quest for inclusion into the Alliance, NATO itself is unlikely to be in any hurry to invite states that it sees as Russian proxies. More to the point, a Moscow-aligned Georgia is not likely to fulfill the reform and governance requirements of NATO for accession. Clearly, this is a non-option.

Alternately, a more plausible option for Georgia would be to create conditions in which Russia has no choice but to withdraw its aggressive posture towards Georgia. As this is unlikely to be fulfilled by mere acts of diplomacy – even recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent would not satisfy Russian foreign policy goals – Georgia should instead look to make the proposition of another invasion one of unacceptably high risk to Russia.

Currently, Georgia’s military is oriented towards interoperability with NATO operations and command structures – probably in an effort to ‘prove’ its worth as a NATO partner. Though laudable, on its own it will almost assuredly not result in NATO membership. Instead, Georgia’s military should be developed expressly and explicitly for the task of territorial defense.

Creating this ability in the Georgian armed forces would be no minor task, as it involves not just a quantitative increase in the size of its military, but also in procuring defense systems and acquiring new capabilities. Perhaps more than anything, Georgia may want to reconsider its current focus on its ground forces, which alone will never be able to resist a full Russian invasion. Rather, the Georgian armed forces should consider investing in its long-neglected and near-invisible air forces, which can more quickly respond to defense contingencies and act as force multipliers for ground and naval forces. Conceivably, a couple of squadrons of multirole fighters could police Georgian airspace and allow for ground attack units like its existing SU-25s and attack helicopters to support ground operations. Perhaps more importantly, the deterrent role of an advanced air force could prevent such a situation from ever happening in the first place.

Of course, there are obstacles to acquiring this capability as well. Besides the steep costs normally associated with procuring and maintaining advanced fighters, the de facto arms embargo that is currently in force against Georgia makes acquiring such equipment doubly hard. However, the case for selling Georgia defensive equipment is a comparatively much simpler task than banking on a sudden change of heart by NATO, and particularly more-so given France’s apparent willingness to sell Russia a wish list of arms (3). Though hardly a foregone conclusion, there are enough potential sellers of multirole jet aircraft – both new and secondhand – to leverage a purchase of the equipment Georgia needs to defend itself.

Georgia faces an altogether different set of expectations from other countries in its NATO application process that cannot be resolved by deft diplomacy or good reforms alone. For Georgia to truly make headway towards Euro-Atlantic integration, it must make the cost of another Russian invasion unacceptably high for Moscow. Though Tbilisi would never win in an arms race with Russia, it can at least develop its defenses to a point where Moscow’s threshold for a military option is appreciably raised. A more secure geostrategic position coupled with strong reform progress is the only way for Georgia to ever have a chance of joining NATO and forever freeing itself from the long arm of Moscow.

SIMOTAN V

Merkel defends Germany's Afghanistan mandate

According to , Chancellor Angela Merkel defended Germany's military presence in Afghanistan on Thursday - rejecting opposition claims that the country was now involved in a level of warfare that parliament had not agreed to.

Merkel's address to parliament followed the recent deaths of seven German soldiers in two insurgent attacks in northern Afghanistan, prompting renewed soul-searching in a country where the military mission is already deeply unpopular.

'This mandate is valid, over and above any sensible doubt under international or constitutional law,' Merkel said in an address to the Bundestag, or parliament.

The chancellor said she understood those who referred to the conflict as 'war' but added that the parliament had been fully aware of conditions in Afghanistan when they agreed to extend the military mandate earlier this year.

'We can't expect bravery from our soldiers, if we lack the courage to stand up for what we agreed to,' the chancellor added.

Merkel and Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, both of the ruling Christian Democrats (CDU), have raised legal questions in recent months by acknowledging that the armed conflict in Afghanistan could be described as 'war' in common parlance.

As a result, opposition leader Sigmar Gabriel of the Social Democrats (SDP) has questioned the validity of the current mandate, which authorizes the German military to take part in 'armed conflict' in the region.

The government would legally have to seek renewed parliamentary approval for a mandate to wage war in Afghanistan.

War is legally defined as a conflict between states, which does not aptly describe the conflict that Germany is engaged in under the NATO umbrella.

Tipping point in Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo: EU and NATO must finish the job

Despite progress, trouble looms in Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo. Better engagement now by NATO and the EU can prevent backsliding.

Remember Bosnia? Kosovo? In the 1990s, we learned a new phrase – ethnic cleansing – and we embarked on the first of what have now been many interventions in regional crises. Yet 15 years after the Serbian massacre of more than 7,000 Muslims at Srebrenica, we have still not finished the job of making the Balkans peaceful and safe for all.

This was the subject of a recent hearing held by Sens. Jeanne Shaheen, Jim DeMint, and George Voinovich in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It’s also a subject likely to be discussed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at this week’s NATO meeting in Estonia.

To be sure, the region has seen some success. Slovenia and Croatia are vibrant democracies, increasingly prosperous, and members of NATO. Slovenia is also a member of the European Union, and Croatia is well on its way. Albania is a member of NATO. And Montenegro is making rapid progress.

But trouble looms. With nationalists pulling at the fabric of Bosnia, with Serbia and a handful of EU members refusing to recognize an independent Kosovo, with Serbia still not having found its place in the European family, with NATO and the EU fatigued on further enlargement, with crime and corruption rampant, the region risks sliding back into instability and worse.

This can be prevented – at far lower cost than it took to stop ethnic cleansing in the 1990s, or what it would cost to intervene again. Compared with Afghanistan, we have advantages in the Balkans: no active fighting; a literate population and skilled workforce; an advanced economy; and a surrounding region made up of EU and NATO members.

What’s more, we know what is needed for success: using the attractive power of NATO and the EU to drive through tough but needed reforms.

The challenge in the Balkans is the same challenge Europe has faced for centuries – overcoming history. It is no easy task. It takes strong incentives and disincentives for nations to let go of irredentism, the memories of territories lost, and the grievances of past warfare, and instead to invest in the future.

But as we saw in the 1990s, the real, near-term prospect of NATO and EU membership provides just that kind of incentive structure. It strengthens the hand of reformers in convincing publics that short-term pain and rejecting nationalist agendas will deliver greater benefits, and that the contrast – wallowing in these agendas – will separate a nation from a growing, integrated European family.

Clearly, countries must meet the conditions of membership. They must do the hard work of reform. But the EU and NATO can be passive or active. A passive stance gives little incentive and empowers those with revanchist agendas. But an activist stance, where we stress our willingness to admit new members and work with candidate countries on specific reforms, empowers those who are prepared to implement the fastest and farthest reaching change.

Now is a time to give new energy to finishing the job in the Balkans – to bringing that region fully into the European mainstream before it slides backward. Several steps can be taken:

First, the EU and NATO must reiterate, emphatically and credibly, that they are prepared to admit as members every country in the Balkans that meets the conditions of membership.

Second, to generate this renewed political commitment, Washington will need to engage actively not only with the EU and NATO as institutions, but also with key member states.

Third, the EU and NATO should aggressively use the tools already at their disposal to incentivize necessary reforms – for example, visa-free travel, EU association agreements, and NATO’s Membership Action Plan.

Fourth, in Bosnia, we should maintain a robust international presence and commitment, including a strong, international “high representative” and an EU force, until Bosnia sustainably implements far-reaching reform.

Fifth, we should maintain a robust commitment in Kosovo – both through the nearly 10,000 soldiers that make up the NATO-led Kosovo Force and through the European Union Rule of Law Mission – while pushing for recognition by all EU states and improved governance within (and throughout all) of Kosovo.

Sixth, we need to give a renewed impetus to resolving the Macedonia name issue. Because Greece’s own identity is linked to ancient Macedonia, it strongly objects to its northern neighbor going by the name “Republic of Macedonia.” The Macedonians could begin with modest confidence-building measures – Does the airport really have to be named after Alexander the Great? – followed by compromises by both sides.

Seventh, NATO and the EU should reward Montenegro’s reform successes by accelerating its path toward membership in both institutions – not least because this can spur greater momentum in the region.

Eighth, the US and EU should carry out a robust bilateral engagement with Serbia, building its sense of belonging within the transatlantic community.

And ninth, we should work aggressively with Albania to strengthen democratic institutions, transparency, and anticorruption, in part by leveraging the prospect of EU membership.

Resolving these lingering issues is difficult, but doable. And far better to invest the energy and effort now, when the region is calm, than to risk greater instability in the future. Remember: The worst human-rights atrocities in Europe since the Holocaust happened in the Balkans just 15 years ago.

Vacancies left for DAYS 2010

Dear YATA-members,

Deadline for application for our annual youth seminar DAYS is now expired. However, we still have some vacancies left and we encourage all interested to apply for participation as soon as possible.

DAYS 2010 is the 25th anniversary of the event gathering young people from different countries to discuss and engage in foreign and security politics. The program is almost finished and we look forward to introducing you to a very inspiring and exiting seminar.

For more information you can have a look at our website: www.atlant.dk/days.html
Where you will also find the invitation and application form for DAYS 2010.

Application, motivation letter or questions can be sent to emma@atlant.dk

Best regards,
Emma Hjernø
Project Coordinator DAYS 2010

Quick piece on Prague dinner America and eastern Europe Guess who's coming to dinner?

Barack Obama tries to fix damaged relations with eastern European allies

THE Obama administration’s closest European allies are oddly tricky to please. An invitation to the leaders of the 11 ex-communist members of NATO to dine with the president in Prague on April 8th was meant to repair a relationship both cherished and moaned about. Instead, indigestion was looming even before the meal was cooked.


It should have gone smoothly. The president is in Prague to sign a new nuclear disarmament agreement with Russia. Even the twitchiest ex-communist countries don’t mind that. The choice of Prague, the capital of a key American ally in the region, over a neutral location such as Geneva, was meant to signal America’s continued commitment to the region’s security. Mr Obama could have simply headed home after the ceremony, or travelled on to a meeting with one big ally. Instead, he chose to invite, admittedly at short notice, all of his ex-communist allies to talk.


The first sign of trouble was that the guest list looked odd. From the three Baltic states, the administration invited the presidents (Toomas Hendrik Ilves of Estonia, Valdis Zatlers of Latvia and Dalia Grybauskaite of Lithuania). But from most of the other eight countries, it was the prime ministers. Admittedly, lines of responsibility between heads of state and government can be blurred. But the rationale for including the mainly ceremonial Baltic presidents but snubbing the Polish president, Lech Kaczynski, who has rather more clout, was mystifying.


While heads were being scratched, Ms Grybauskaite dropped a small bomb. She would not be going to Prague, she said. Her prime minister, Andrius Kubilius, would stand in for her. Explaining her decision, Ms Grybauskaite complained that the dinner would involve “no decision-making”, that it was organised by junior officials, that its outcome was unclear and that she would have only two minutes to talk one-on-one with Mr Obama. Coming from a country roughly one-hundredth America’s size, that showed a startling self-confidence, even by Lithuanian standards.


Next came a remark by a “senior US official” in the New York Times, that the president “will seek to impress upon regional leaders a new attitude toward Russia in which the outmoded fears of Russians hiding under the bed are a thing of the past”. That appeared to confirm the east Europeans’ darkest fears about America’s new cosiness with Russia. Senior officials dealing with the region in the White House and the State Department categorically denied that any such thinking lay behind the dinner.


Clumsiness in American presentation of policy in the region is nothing new. Some Poles are still fuming about the botched announcement of a change in American missile defence plans on September 17th last year. That date, the anniversary of the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland, matters there roughly as much as Pearl Harbour day does in America. The blunder followed a fretful public protest from leading figures in the region, such as Vaclav Havel, about weakening transatlantic ties.


But since then the administration has worked hard to improve things. It has pushed through NATO contingency plans for the Baltic states, the alliance’s most vulnerable members, bringing a spectacular German flip-flop on this previously taboo issue. The new missile defence scheme is bigger and better than the one it ditched. And now the president, on yet another visit to Europe, has invited everyone to dinner.


The lingering difficulties reflect the real problem in the US relationship with central Europe, which is in the ingredients, not the cooking. The days of instinctive Atlanticism in the region are over, as Ms Grybauskaite’s haughty stance, which would once have been inconceivable, demonstrates. The ex-communist allies’ contribution to solving most of America’s problems is marginal, at best. Europe itself is divided and lacks credibility in the eyes of busy Americans. Sorting that out needs hard thinking and a long slog, not just a nice dinner