A new balance in Europe

(Nov 19th 2009From The Economist print edition)

America is listening to Russia's call for new security arrangements in Europe

IN THEORY, Russian diplomats accredited to NATO are welcome friends: the reality is murkier. For more than a decade now, Russian officials have been trusted to roam the alliance’s maze-like headquarters in Brussels just like envoys from other “partner countries” such as Sweden, Finland or Malta. In practice, says a diplomat, everyone knows that “the entire Russian mission is [staffed by] spies”. This leads to cat-and-mouse games that range from the serious (in February, an Estonian official was jailed for more than 12 years for selling NATO secrets to Russia) to the comical (guards were posted at the doors of meetings reserved for full NATO members after Russian officials were found hiding their badges and sneaking inside).

Russia’s relations with the European Union are almost as ambiguous. The two sides have lots of mutual interests—the EU buys more than half of all Russian exports, and provides two-thirds of Russia’s foreign direct investment. Yet an odd mood of surly indifference surrounds Russia-EU ties. A formal summit between President Dmitry Medvedev and European Union bosses on November 18th achieved only a few technical agreements, though the two sides had much to discuss, not least gas supplies and Russia’s foot-dragging over climate change.

Part of the problem, diplomats suggest, is that the Kremlin’s interest in Europe has fallen after the “reset” of ties with America this year. Something bigger is going on, though. Since the end of the cold war, European and American policy towards Russia has been overshadowed by the process of enlargement—the expansion first of NATO and then of the EU deep into the former Soviet block. That alarmed Russia and got its attention.

In 2007 Russia’s then president, Vladimir Putin, called the expansion of NATO a “serious provocation”. Russian officials claim (their account is disputed) that at the end of the cold war they had been assured that foreign forces would not be stationed in the ex-communist states. And the Kremlin was particularly angry that a summit of alliance leaders in Bucharest in April 2008 agreed that one day Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO”. A few months after the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, a senior German diplomat had no hesitation in referring to it as “a war over enlargement”.

Now that enlargement has greatly slowed, a new equilibrium between Europe, Russia and America may emerge. For the past year, Russia has talked vaguely but forcefully of creating a new “European security architecture”. That sounded to many like an attempt to subvert NATO. But these days America seems to be listening, if only to hear what Russia wants. The Obama administration has privately welcomed a new venture by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an American think-tank, which will ask a high-octane clutch of retired Russian, European and American politicians and diplomats to ponder an “inclusive Euro-Atlantic security system” that might answer Russia’s call.

What it may all mean in practice remains a mystery. Senior Russians talk of “legally binding” security guarantees for their country, or of a body like a United Nations Security Council for Europe, in which Russia would have a seat. They suggest a security treaty could be unveiled next year. That is a political non-starter. If Russia wants guarantees that NATO will never attack it, says an east European foreign minister, it can have that “signed and sealed on paper, because we have no intention of attacking them”; but if Russia wants a veto over the defence arrangements of its neighbours, such as the deployment of American bases or missile-defence systems, that would cross a red line.

In any case, it is hard to see how such a discussion can get far without exposing deep European divisions over Russia. One of the benefits of Article 5, the collective defence pledge that underpins NATO, is that it leaves unspoken the potential sources of danger for alliance members. For new members from the ex-communist block, Article 5 is mainly an insurance policy against Russia. For Germany or France, an attack from Russia is unthinkable—and the ambiguity of the pledge papers over that divide. A discussion about legally binding guarantees with Russia, even guarantees of non-aggression, would risk exposing such differences among the allies.
In truth, say European diplomats, the Russians may already have achieved much of what they want. A big Russian goal was to halt NATO enlargement, and to stop American plans to station a missile-defence radar in the Czech Republic along with interceptors in Poland. America now says the first phase of the system will be based on ships at sea, with a radar closer to Iran. And NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia is a distant prospect.

Much the same is true of EU enlargement. Russian leaders grumble about the EU’s “Eastern partnership” with six countries that Russia considers part of its sphere of influence: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. But Europe is not seeking a sphere of influence. The partnership is a sop for countries that the EU does not want to invite as full members (and, as a result, it may not give the EU much influence at all).
Better in America’s sphere than Russia’s

Twenty years after the cold war, and with America now past its “unipolar” moment, Europe is entering a new phase in its security. Some illusions need to be shed: starting with the idea that Europe, America and Russia are friends with shared values. Yet they need not be enemies (despite the spying, it remains sensible to have Russians at NATO, for example). Russia has the right to suggest new rules of coexistence. But Europe and America have the right to ask Russia to keep existing pledges, notably on the rule of law. Russia will not be a guarantor of security for Europe any time soon. For now, only America can credibly play that role.