YATA Blog

Changing NATO and its current most important tasks

2011-12-11T19:40:00.003+01:00

Written by Tomáš Teleky

The international security environment has a very dynamic character. Due to quick progress in technology, increasing international interdependence, climate changes and many other factors, NATO has to face newly emerging threats like cyber terrorism, migration, energy security and many others. Situation now is much different than it was ten years ago. NATO in its new Strategic Concept (NSC) adopted in Lisbon summit in November last year, presented a vision of Allies for the next decade. This document is NATO’s roadmap for the next decade. The aim of the NSC was not only the reflection of the whole spectrum of threats (traditional and new) but also to provide guideline how to tackle them.

In the time of Cold War the majority of NATO‘s activities were closely connected to principle of deterrence. But after the big geopolitical changes concerning the end of the Cold War and breakup of the Soviet Union the role of NATO has changed. The war in Balkans and the threat of spreading instability from unstable regions showed that deterrence is not sufficient enough and NATO will have to intervene more in the future. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon from 9/11 showed us that in globalised world we are much more vulnerable than it was before. Today we have to eliminate possible threats also in distant regions before it is too late. NATO realized that out of area missions beyond Europe are inevitable.

The mission ISAF in Afghanistan launched ten years ago remains the biggest challenge for the Alliance. In Lisbon summit the Allies agreed that process of transition in Afghanistan will be completed in 2014. However it doesn’t mean that all coalition troops will leave the country until this date. NATO will continue to train Afghan army and police also after the end of transitional process. Afghans must be able to take care of security in the country. Major NATO’s effort in Afghanistan therefore consists in training. In March 2011 seven Afghan provinces already took responsibility for their own security. Despite the big progress in many provinces, Afghanistan still remains one of the poorest countries in the world with terrible economic situation, problems with producing and trafficking of drugs and high ethnic fragmentation. Afghanistan after 2014 will undoubtedly need (not only) financial help of NATO to meet the present challenges.

When we speak about stability in Afghanistan we just cannot forget on Pakistan which has a great impact on the stability in the region. Stability of Afghanistan and stability of Pakistan are mutually intertwined. It is a big challenge for NATO to settle disputes with Pakistan and find an effective way of cooperation especially today when the US-Pakistani relations have been getting worse because of US unilateral actions in Pakistan.

In the crisis management, there are many challenges for NATO. Operation in Afghanistan has revealed many deficiencies. There are 3 main lessons learnt from the expeditionary operation:

1. NATO needs more deployable troops

Territorial defence still remains the fundamental role of NATO but the majority of current security threats originate far away from the NATO’s border. The armed forces of NATO member states must also reflect the character of current threats. We do not need big armies no more because the major conventional attack on NATO is currently very unlikely. What we need is to have deployable armed forces which will be ready to response very quickly to new threats and intervene in distant regions.

2. NATO needs assets and capabilities to do same actions in different places

NATO must be not only able to deploy its troops wherever required but must also have suitable capabilities for realization of necessary activities which reflect character of particular geographical region and substance of the threats. Operation in Afghanistan demonstrates that military approach must be supported also with civilian aspects.

3. NATO must continue reaching out international organizations

Broader and deeper cooperation with relevant international organizations is inevitable. The NSC pays a big attention to importance of partnerships and cooperation with other international organizations especially EU, UN and OSCE. The both NATO and EU emphasize the necessity of constructive mutual cooperation with the aim to minimize unwanted duplication.

NATO must also focus more on enhancing cooperation with Russia. Since the end of the Cold War the relations between NATO and Russia have looked like a sinusoid. In Lisbon summit the both sides have decided to leave behind all disputes from the age of the Cold War and focus on constructive cooperation with the aim to achieve common goals. In Lisbon NATO and Russia agreed on cooperation in the field of missile defence. But one year after the summit it is more than clear that different visions on this issue represent a serious obstacle for the cooperation. Despite of this fact NATO cannot afford to worsen relations with Russia because Russia still remains a strategic partner for NATO. NATO cannot underestimate the historical context because it helps to understand today’s reality but NATO must also be aware of its position. NATO must keep engaging Russia to mutual projects because Russia is not the one that will push the other side to broader cooperation. There are many areas where the interests of NATO and Russia are identical and in which cooperation would be mutually beneficial and NATO must focus on them.

And last but not least issue I want to mention is Smart Defence. It is ambitious project presented by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in Lisbon. The substance of this approach consists in multinational cooperation and specialization of the Allies. In foreign policy of the NATO member states, the national interest will always be crucial. However NATO members have to realize the benefits of the multinational cooperation from longer term perspective and rethink their policies. In time of austerity and decreasing of defence budgets it seems to be one of the possible solutions how to deal with current situation. In Europe we have several successful examples of multinational defence cooperation. In respect of necessity of specialization, NATO members have to also realize that nowadays it is not possible to keep full spectrum of capabilities. NATO members have to give up some capabilities in order to save money for financing and modernizing others, more important capabilities. This is of course a very sensitive political issue and many countries hesitate to do so. Smart Defence with the principles of “pooling and sharing” is undoubtedly a vital approach but it still lacks concrete political decisions.

NATO summit in Chicago offers an ideal opportunity to work out the details of the most important issues for NATO. Until May, there is a space for discussing relevant issues with a view to find compromises among Allies and set a better stage for the summit.

Assisting West Africa, Preventing a Second Somalia

2011-11-12T18:10:00.004+01:00

Written by James Bridger

Over the past year, pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) have increased in number and expanded in geographical range. It appears that West Africa’s pirates are becoming more organized and have now begun to mimic the tactics of their Somali counterparts—a development that has been met with great international concern. As was the case in the Gulf of Aden, the need for a robust counter-piracy strategy for West Africa has been loudly proclaimed by regional states, Atlantic powers and international organizations. The worry however, is that this will amount to little more than platitudes if political will and local security capacity remain in short supply.

The centerpiece of the current strategy is a Nigerian initiative which calls for joint naval patrols to be conducted by the region’s littoral states. Though multilateral maritime security cooperation is a commendable concept, the reality of the current patrols is that they are a largely a Nigerian effort with only token participation from its small neighbours. Nigeria is the only state in the region that possesses frigates, corvettes, and an aerial surveillance capacity. The other littoral nations “navies” are more accurately described as coastguards. Given that a coalition of the world’s most powerful navies has been unable to suppress piracy in East Africa, it is highly unlikely that a collection of impoverished West African states with little manpower and equipment will be able to secure a coastal perimeter that spans 12 countries. Foreign assistance is therefore essential.

In late September, Benin asked the UN to send an international force to help police the GoG. However, with the naval forces of NATO, the EU, and other maritime powers currently committed to costly operations on the other side of the continent, there is little appetite for a West African deployment. Instead, the UNSC has called on the international community to assist local organizations through “information sharing, coordination improvement and capacity building.” If managed effectively, this strategy presents the best option for achieving long-term maritime security in the GoG.

West Africa is becoming increasingly important to Washington, as it is estimated that the region will supply a quarter of US oil imports by 2015. Seeking to build up local capacity, US naval vessels have been sent to train Beninois, Togolese and Ghanaian sailors as part of a cooperative program known as the Africa Partnership Station. France, which maintains close ties with its former colonies in the region, has also been actively engaged in West African counter-piracy. Aside from assisting with training and equipment, Paris has also deployed its own frigate, the Germinal, to help survey the coast and neutralize pirates. Drawing on lessons learned in East Africa, the UK has advocated for the expansion of coastal surveillance and law enforcement facilities in the region.

While the bilateral programs already initiated are a step in the right direction, a more comprehensive strategy is ultimately required. As the German Ambassador to the UN recently recognized, an effective counter-piracy policy must place security assistance within a political and legal framework. This presents an opportunity for NATO and the EU to improve cooperation with the multinational organizations of West Africa, primarily the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

NATO was able to build strong partnerships with a number of North African and Middle Eastern states through the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperative Initiative—culminating in a broad base of regional support for Operation Unified Protector in Libya. Maritime security provision in West Africa could lay similar groundwork in a region that is taking on increasing global importance.

Regional maritime security could be improved through the military assistance of additional NATO members, a project that would combine maritime training with the provision of patrols boats and radar and intelligence sharing installations. The EU is better positioned to address the political and economic causes of piracy. Drug trafficking, government corruption and the unjust practices of foreign oil companies are all exacerbating the offshore crisis. Simply throwing money at regional states will not solve the problem if these issues go unaddressed.

If the international community does not wish to see a complete bicoastal breakdown of African maritime order, then the time to act is now.

The Importance of EU – NATO Strategic Partnership: visions and perspectives

2011-11-07T08:54:00.003+01:00

Written by Tomáš Teleky

The role of EU and NATO for the stability in the Euro-Atlantic region is crucial. The importance of the cooperation between these two organizations is unquestioned. But this cooperation is still not efficient enough. How to enhance this strategic partnership?

The same goals but different strategy

The role of NATO and the European Union is substantial not only for stability and development in the Europe and Euro-Atlantic region but also for stability in the other countries with strategic impact on international community. Many experts agree that promotion of Euro-Atlantic security can be best assured through the broader and deeper cooperation between NATO and EU. Despite the fact that membership of both NATO and the EU is almost identical and both organisations share the same values like democracy, freedom, rule of law or respect of human rights, the mutual cooperation between them has still many shortcomings and lacks efficiency. The goals of both organisations are the same in the broad context but the strategy of their fulfilment is often very different. The serious obstacle for deeper cooperation is not only the result of different character and the way how the organisations were established, but also very often the lack of constructive dialogue and political will.

The NATO’s new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon summit in November last year pays big attention to partnerships with other countries and international organizations. Cooperation with the EU is currently one of the main priorities of NATO and both organizations agree that it must be improved. The Allies have been trying to find the way of cooperation based on comprehensive approach which would prevent them from unreasonable duplication but with the respect to the autonomy of both organizations. The importance of the EU as for the stability in the region is unquestionable and its importance has been growing since EU began to form the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The mutual goals and proclamations are ambitious but the reality shows us that the EU and NATO still have not found the proper “modus vivendi”. The most important is the practical cooperation in the operations where the both organizations participate. The examples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo or The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia demonstrate that this constructive cooperation is possible when the high officials of the EU and NATO member states are ready to talk to each other and to listen to each other. On the other hand, as for the operation in Afghanistan, it is much more difficult to cooperate because the competencies of both organizations are not clear enough.

No more duplication, more synchronization

The history of international relations has taught us that comprehensive dialogue is the best way how to promote cooperation. The regular political consultations at all levels represent a good framework for cooperation and should definitely continue also in the future. It is the best way how the Allies can minimize duplication and maximize cost-effectiveness. Especially now, in the age of austerity and underfinanced defence budgets of the many EU and NATO members, the minimization of the undesirable duplication will be crucial. This approach is in accord with the vision of NATO´s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and NATO’s “Smart Defence” policy. According to this approach, the Allies can ensure greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility. This is not only the matter of cooperation of NATO member states but also with other international organizations, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.

The NATO-EU partnership has evolved hand by hand with the evolution of the ESDP. The Important steps about how to enhance mutual cooperation was adopting of NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP in December 2002, which affirmed the main principles of mutual relationship. Adopting of The “Berlin-Plus” arrangements was important for the closer cooperation in crisis management. These documents contributed to enhancing of mutual cooperation and since that time the several operations have been carrying out by NATO and EU side by side: in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Darfur and in the Gulf of Aden, where the NATO and EU naval forces fight the Somalia pirates.

It may seem that partnership of two organizations with 21 member states in common must be unchallenged, however, reality is different and many mutual talks have been obstructed because of divergent views of particular member states. Nevertheless, the potential of this strategic partnership is much higher. Mutual dialogue does not bring any strategic cooperation. Europe cannot afford this inefficiency and duplications in these austere times. The question is how to make a change and how to make it quickly. The common interests offer a broad spectrum for cooperation. Now it is time for action which must be visible especially in the “out-of-area” missions. The both organization must work together closer on capability development and lead strategic discussions, not only empty dialogue. This approach is beneficial for Europe but is also supported by the USA which has been calling for a long time for higher participation of Europe in the field of defence. The potential of this strategic partnership is unique and enormous. But we must start to act now. Synchronization, complementary operations, regular dialogue and exchange of views must become reality as soon as possible.

Reflections on the 2011 Atlantic Council of Canada NATO Tour

2011-11-04T09:51:00.002+01:00

Written by James Bridger

A group from the Atlantic Council of Canada recently returned from a week long tour of Belgium and France, in which we received briefings at NATO headquarters and other key transatlantic security and political institutions. Provided here is a compilation of the insights we gained into three primary areas of transatlantic concern: NATO-EU relations, NATO’s partnership expansion efforts, and the search for “smart defence".

NATO-EU Relations

Sharing 21 member states, there is much common ground between NATO and the EU in regards to security, democratization, and human rights. It was noted by the Canadian Delegation to the EU, however, that the two organizations also have different interests, objectives and priorities. Common members are thus forced to divide limited resources between the two. In order to increase efficiency and spheres of responsibility, officials from both NATO and EU stressed the need to avoid overlap while working in the same theatre.

It was only in 2009 that the EU moved towards becoming a unified foreign policy and security actor, with the establishment of the EU External Action Service (EEAS). While the project still remains in its infancy, the European Union has been involved in several small peace-keeping missions in Africa, police training in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and counter-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa. Officials on both side of the divided were generally optimistic about EU-NATO cooperation, though it was noted that non-common members—namely Turkey and Cyprus—have blocked closer integration at several turns.

The issue was raised during the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) briefings that it may be an inefficient use of resources for both NATO and the EU to maintain their own separate counter-piracy flotillas off the Horn of Africa—operations Ocean Shield and Atalanta respectively. While member state composition overlaps, it was noted by the EU Cell at SHAPE that certain countries “feel more comfortable” participating in either the NATO or EU context. Representatives from both parties stated they were content with the current level of cooperation. In private however, a French naval officer from NATO expressed bewilderment about the duplicate command structures of Ocean Shield and Atalanta.

NATO Partnership Expansion

A final issue of great importance was the expansion of NATO’s global partnerships through the Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperative Initiative and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. These programs have brought the Alliance into contact with a diverse array of actors. Individually tailored strategies of engagement are required, the Public Diplomacy Division informed us, as relations with Finland and Turkmenistan, for example, cannot be managed in the same way.

Over the past year, NATO’s relations with the Arab world have been at the forefront of the Alliance’s agenda. An officer from the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division explained that the Alliance and its intentions were misperceived by many in the Middle East and that recent efforts had been focused on promoting better mutual understanding. This strategy now appears to be bearing fruit. Both Morocco and Israel participated in Operation Active Endeavor—NATO’s counter-terrorism naval patrol of the Mediterranean—while Qatar, the UAE, and Jordan all contributed to Operation Unified Protector in Libya. Aside from improving interoperability with its Middle Eastern and Mediterranean partners, NATO has also sought to push for greater military transparency in the region and democratic control of the armed forces.

The Alliance’s relationship with Moscow, managed through the NATO-Russia Council, has been marked by both cooperation and confrontation. A policy officer specializing in Russian relations informed us that the two parties had been working together in Afghanistan to open up transport routes, engage in counter-narcotics operations and supply helicopters to the ANA (see page * for more information about NATO in Afghanistan). Moscow has also worked alongside NATO during Mediterranean and East African naval patrols. The biggest point of contention between the Alliance and Russia is missile defence. Moscow has continuously objected to the stationing of interceptor missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland, stating that it wants its own hand in Eastern European missile defence—a proposal NATO’s Baltic members refuse to accept. The Alliance is trying to explain that the system is designed to protect members from rogue states and is not directed against Russia; regardless, it does not appear that the two sides will see eye to eye for the foreseeable future. Moscow’s diplomatic and military support of Georgia’s breakaway republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, also continues to be a thorn in NATO-Russia Relations.

Smart Defence in an Age of Austerity

The need to cut costs in an age of fiscal austerity looms over every aspect of NATO operations. We were told during the first briefing that a current priority is cutting down the size of the command structure by reducing the Alliance’s “tooth to tail ratio”—the number of support staff required for each policy maker. An effort is also being made to bridge the civilian-military divide in order to avoid unnecessary overlap. A new headquarters that physically brings these two sides together is part of this plan.

Several officials spoke about the need for “smart defence,” a buzz term that calls for greater cooperation, specialization and prioritization among members’ military procurement. We were told how smaller states have given up full defensive capabilities in favour of a more specialized role within the Alliance. Denmark, for example, no longer fields submarines, while the Baltic states are retiring their fighter jets. These types of reductions, we were told, involve member states giving up a degree of their defensive sovereignty over certain areas—a strategy which requires great faith and trust in NATO’s protective shield. The Alliance has also sought to engage in multinational equipment procurement programs to reduce costs. This approach has been problematic in the past however: NATO was tasked with producing 110 variants of the NH90 Helicopter in order to meet member state specifications, making the program impossibly complex.

With many member states falling short of the Alliance’s two percent goal for defense spending, attaching restrictive caveats to their forces’ use, and looking to slash their defence budgets further, the charge that NATO is becoming a “two tier alliance” has been oft spoken. While one got a sense of the uncertainty regarding NATO’s future role and capabilities, we were reminded that the Alliance had always in effect been “two tier”—the US has consistently done the heavy lifting, France and the UK play an important secondary role, while the remaining nations contribute to lesser degrees. The issue of military spending nevertheless remains of paramount importance. The Canadian Delegation to NATO noted that it will be one of the main areas of focus at the 2012 Chicago Summit.

Diplomacy And Peace-Building: Women’s voices must be heard

2011-11-02T09:07:00.006+01:00

Written by Astghik Injeyan, Armenian Atlantic Association

Do not look at us as victims, but treat us as guardians of peace and harmony…

Women suffered greatly during the wars, where their children and husbands were killed, they were raped, tortured, left homeless and abandoned. But even in such circumstances women didn’t lose their hope and fought for their families, for people they didn’t know and for their nations.

There is a monument in Yerevan, the city where I am living, called Mother Armenia, which represents a woman warrior with a sword in her hands, watching the city from the high point. Inside this huge monument there is a military museum: “Armenians in the World War II” and “Artsakh War in 1988-1994”. This monument symbolizes Armenian women protecting their children and values with arms on their hands while husbands and sons fighting for their families and homeland.

We are, arguably, a nation nurtured by women. The most touching last paragraph of Yegishe’s History of Vardan and the Armenian War[1] describe Armenia depleted of its men and soldiers, and action of women in this tragic reality. “The bridal chambers of young girls became empty, the widowed became again as virtuous brides, and even the noble women of Armenia, who had been brought up in luxury and petted in costly clothing and on soft couches, went untiringly to the houses of prayer, on foot and bare-footed, asking with vows that they might be enabled to endure their great affliction“.

It was the principles and stories of our ancestress that the new generation of Armenian men was raised on. The Armenian mother, remaining pure and untainted at home, was charged with giving the future generation the gifts of our culture in order to protect from the mixture with non-religious nations. Apparently, the lessons Armenian mothers taught their kids were not forgotten through the years.

Time passed and Armenian women saw lot of suffering. During Artsakh war there were women who forgot everything and rushed to join their brothers in the border.

The story of our women has a paradoxical narrative. On the one hand, they have been subject to backwardness at best and violence at worst, and on the other hand, the monumental role they have played in our nation’s life has always been applauded.

International organizations are slowly recognizing the indispensable role that women play in preventing war and sustaining peace. On October 31, 2000, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1325 urging the secretary-general to expand the role of women in U.N. field-based operations, especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights workers and humanitarian personnel. It is important to mention that NATO and its Partners are taking concerted action to support implementation of UNSCR 1325[2].

Women universally bear the burden of taking daily care for their families and communities and they are the primate stakeholders with interest in community stability, so they play important roles in peace-building in unofficial ways. Some women are peace activists advocating for non-violence, others are mediators, educators or facilitators of capacity-building. Women often bridge divides across traditional ethnic, religious and cultural divisions, coming together on the shared concerns about practicalities of life.

The security has become a key area where NGOs, Think Tanks, civil society and donors can engage Government on issues pertaining to the empowering women. Women are crucial to inclusive security, since they are often at the center of nongovernmental organizations, popular protests, electoral referendums, and other citizen-empowering movements whose influence has grown with the global spread of democracy.

Women are active in Track Two diplomacy[3], informal peace protests, community dialogue, promoting intercultural tolerance and in practical peace initiatives. However, they are absolutely deprived from participation in formal peace negotiations. One of the key issues in Armenia and in the entire region that requires consistent efforts of the governments, civil societies and development partners, remains the involvement of women in conflict resolution and peace process. Many power-driven projects are initiated where women are actively involved. However, women remain alienated from the real decision making processes. These projects generate huge amount of important ideas and results, which are diminishing, as they are not used and heard. That’s why it’s time to stream the results of Track Two into Track One diplomacy[4]. Women can play significant role of the agents for change in their societies in conflict for transformation, confidence building and reconciliation.

Bringing women to the peace table and including them in formal processes is a must. There is strong need to engage women in Track One Diplomacy and increase the number of women at decision-making levels in national, regional and International institutions involved in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts.

Women’s voices should be heard in important decisions; they should be given opportunity to use their experiences to help prevent future generations from suffering the same issues.

As part of the Alliance’s comprehensive approach, there is a need to seek maximum cooperation with all involved International actors, particularly in the area of training and education.

Being the educators of their children, women must be empowered, as they are growing our future and successor generation, with understanding of moral values within the home, in their communities and in society.

Women need to be secured, in order to give birth and grow up our future generation.

[1] Eghishe (AD 410 – 475) Armenian historian. He was the author of a history documenting the successful revolt of the Armenians in the 5th century against the rule and religion of the Sassanid Persians.

[2] UNSCR1325: http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf

[3] Track 2 diplomacy is a specific kind of informal diplomacy, in which non-officials (academic scholars, retired civil and military officials, public figures, and social activists) engage in dialogue, with the aim of conflict resolution, or confidence-building.

[4] Track 1 diplomacy- official diplomacy

SAC NON-RESIDENT COOPERATION (Research)

2011-08-30T17:20:00.002+02:00

OPEN CALL: NON-RESIDENT COOPERATION (RESEARCH)

The Slovak Atlantic Commission invites applications from young scholars who are interested in research cooperation with its newly established Central European Policy Institute.

Slovak Atlantic Commission, as an organization with long record in supporting young professionals in the field of international affairs, launches a think tank connecting scholars from Central Europe in multi-generation way. Young scholars from Central-European countries, who wish to boost their career by gaining all-important experience in policy-oriented research and advocacy activities, can work together with our senior research fellows.

Who are we looking for?
We are looking for Master or Doctoral degree students or graduates:
- interested in long-term non-resident cooperation in research and advocacy;
- with experience in academic writing;
- looking for experience in policy-oriented research and advocacy;
- with proficiency in English language;
- possibly with experience from recognized university;
- with good communication skills;
- with expertise in one or more of these topics:

Research and advocacy topics:
- regional cooperation (Visegrad or Central European) in foreign policy and security issues;
- CFSP, energy security, transatlantic partnership and NATO related issues;
- transformation of countries of the Western Balkans, North Africa and Eastern Partnership.

Interns can be involved in one or more of the following activities:
- daily and weekly updates;
- policy briefs and longer studies;
- written commentaries in the Media;

Candidates are allowed but not required to be present in our Bratislava office and are welcomed to cooperate online (ideal for students at foreign universities or young graduates starting their professional career).

Procedure: Please send the following documents to cepi@ata-sac.org with “RESCOOP” in the subject:

- CV with photo in English;

- Cover Letter in English;

- sample of your academic writing (article, analysis) in English.

The applications are accepted throughout the year. For the next round of evaluation, please submit your
application until September 19, 2011.

SAC INTERNSHIP (Research)

2011-08-30T17:16:00.002+02:00

OPEN CALL: INTERN (RESEARCH)

The Slovak Atlantic Commission invites applications from young scholars who are interested in research internships in its newly established Central European Policy Institute.

Slovak Atlantic Commission, as an organization with long record in supporting young professionals in the field of international affairs, launches a think tank connecting scholars from Central Europe in multi-generation way. Young scholars from Central-European countries, who wish to boost their career by gaining all-important experience in policy-oriented research and advocacy activities, can work together with our senior research fellows.

Who are we looking for?
We are looking for Master or Doctoral degree students or graduates:
- interested in 3-12 month internship in our Bratislava office;
- with experience in academic writing;
- looking for experience in policy-oriented research and advocacy;
- with proficiency in English language;
- possibly with experience from recognized university;
- with good communication skills;
- with expertise in one or more of these topics:

Research and advocacy topics:
- regional cooperation (Visegrad or Central European) in foreign policy and security issues;
- CFSP, energy security, transatlantic partnership and NATO related issues;
- transformation of countries of the Western Balkans, North Africa and Eastern Partnership.

Interns are expected to be involved in the following activities:
- daily and weekly updates;
- policy briefs and longer studies;
- advocacy meetings and presentations;
- written and spoken commentaries in the Media;
- providing support to senior analysts.

Procedure: Please send the following documents to cepi@ata-sac.org with “RESINT” in the subject:
- CV with photo in English;
- Cover Letter in English;
- sample of your academic writing (article, analysis) in English.

The applications are accepted throughout the year. For the next round of evaluation, please submit your
application until September 19, 2011.

SAC INTERNSHIP

2011-08-30T16:53:00.005+02:00

OPEN CALL: INTERN

The Slovak Atlantic Commission encourages motivated undergraduate and graduate students to complete an internship in the Slovak Atlantic Commission and take part in its projects and activities.

The Slovak Atlantic Commission, as an organization with long record in supporting young professionals in the field of international affairs, offers full and part-time internship for undergraduate and graduate students who are interested in gaining practical experience in public policy. Interns participate in a variety of activities and support individual programs and projects of the Slovak Atlantic Commission.

Who we are looking for?

We are looking for Bachelor, Master or Doctoral degree students or graduates:

- In the field of International Relations, European Studies, Mass Media Communication, Journalism, Economics and Management (or other fields compatible with activities of the Slovak Atlantic Commission);
- With good communication skills;
- With proficiency in English, French or other foreign languages;

Interns are expected to be involved in one or more of the following activities:

- Project management and project assistance
Public diplomacy events (e.g. GLOBSEC – Bratislava Global Security Forum, EU Enlargement in the Balkans), Expert events (e.g. Visegrad Security Cooperation Initiative, Stratcon), Development projects (e.g. Improving Democratic Institutions: Door to Europe)

- Logistics, technical and support activities
Technical assistance, Public Relations and Marketing, Interpretation and Translation

Internship period depends on intern's agenda and projects run by the Slovak Atlantic Commission at particular time. Determined agenda is based on individual preferences and skills of interns and activities of the organisation.

Procedure: To apply for an internship with the Slovak Atlantic Commission, please submit following documents to hr@ata- sac.org with “INTERNSHIP” in the subject: - CV with photo (English language); - Cover Letter (English language);

The Slovak Atlantic Commission accepts incoming applications throughout the year. For the next round of evaluation, please submit your application until September 4th, 2011.

Gates to Europe/NATO: Pull it together, people

2011-06-10T23:42:00.000+02:00

Defense Secretary Robert Gates's gloomy remarks about the future of NATO represent a parting shot in his long-running struggle to convince Europe to increase military spending and assume a greater role in conflicts such as Afghanistan and Libya.

In his last visit to Europe before stepping down as defense secretary, Gates told an audience at the Security and Defense Agenda, a Brussels-based think tank, that there was a "dwindling appetite and patience" among American taxpayers to expend resources, especially during a time of extreme fiscal constraints, "on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources ... to be serious and capable partners in their own defense."

This prospect led the outgoing defense secretary, who spoke following a meeting of NATO defense ministers, to warn of "a dim, if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance."

Gates has long griped about insufficient European contributions to NATO, though rarely in such a sharp words. In a February 2010 speech, he said the "demilitarization of Europe...has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st."

But not all European defense analysts see the prospect of a "demilitarized" continent as a negative development. "Time and again, we're drawn into military conflicts, often at the pressing of the U.S. and the Pentagon," said Ian Davis, founding director of NATO Watch, citing the Afghan war in particular. "It seems to be quite understandable that there's going to be reluctance from some European states to support policy decisions that are not made on a collective basis."

Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said that Gates's frustrations stem from three issues: Europe's low defense spending, a lack of coordination of resources that encourage wasteful expenditures, and the inadequate contribution of some NATO members to the war in Libya.

Increases in European defense spending are likely off the table for the foreseeable future. With the continent still in the throes of a financial crisis, most countries are looking to make further cuts in their military budgets, not add to them. The British government, long considered the most robust U.S. ally in Europe, announced an 8 percent cut in defense spending over four years in October, and British officials have signaled that they are also considering further reductions. Germany also plans to slash the size of its army from 220,000 soldiers to 170,000.

Gates also criticized European countries, which spend a combined $300 billion on defense per year, for not better coordinating their acquisitions. "[T]he results are significantly less than the sum of the parts" when it comes to European defense spending, he said.

The idea of coordinating defense spending across Europe has made some headway in recent years. Britain and France signed a defense cooperation agreement in November that will establish a joint force between the two countries and see them share an aircraft carrier. And in May, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary announced that they would form a "battle group" led by Poland.

However, this coordination has not been sufficient to allow European countries to play a significantly larger military role. "There is concern that...if Europe doesn't succeed in being able to broaden its geopolitical footprint, that its geopolitical relevance to the United States wanes," Kupchan said.

Gates bemoaned the scant participation of NATO members in the Libya mission, saying, "the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country, yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the U.S., once more, to make up the difference."

While Gates only addressed the issue of Europe's declining military strength, Kupchan said that he just as well could have been sounding the alarm about the economic and political problems facing the continent. "The European project as a whole is in trouble. It's not just the crisis of the eurozone, it's a renationalization of political life, it's a German government that is missing in action because of Merkel's weakness," he said. "I think to some extent the message from Washington is: ‘Pull it together, friends.'"

2010-09-23T11:45:00.003+02:00

ATA and YATA discussion on the new NATO´s Strategic Concept at GLOBSEC 2010

On 14th September, the Slovak Atlantic Commission organised a discussion of Civilian Advisers to NATO GoE on the new Strategic Concept (STEVEN FLANAGAN and CAMILLE GRAND). The discussion was chaired by TOMÁŠ VALÁŠEK, Member of the Board of SAC, and among participants were members of 9 chapters of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) and Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA).

The discussion represented a unique opportunity for opinion-makers and young leaders from Euro-Atlantic area to discuss process of preparation of the new NATO's Strategic Concept two weeks before NATO Secretary General introduces his draft of the document at the end of September. The discussion also embraced remarks of Amb. ANATOLY ADAMISHIN, President of the Association for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, on the European Security Treaty of President Medvedev in relation to the new Strategic Concept, and remarks of Amb. JERZY NOWAK, Vice – President of the Polish Euro – Atlantic Association.

Photo gallery from the discussion is available at http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2010/index.php?mact=Album,m6,default,1&m6albumid=29&m6returnid=55&page=55

Report from the discussion you can find at http://www.ata-sac.org/subory/file/Report_Briefing_ATA.pdf

NATO's position on Georgia and relations with Russia

2010-09-22T17:07:00.000+02:00

From Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO [2]: This bridge across Europe, between NATO and Russia, makes Europe more stable and more secure. Yes, we disagree every once in a while, and fundamentally on some issues, such as over Georgia. But we have learned not to let that overshadow the importance and the potential of this relationship, to make us all safer. ...

Now, I can imagine a few of you thinking: nice image, but a little bit rosy. What about the areas where NATO countries and Russia disagree? For example, what about Georgia?

And I fully share those concerns. There will certainly be issues on which we simply can’t agree. The massive numbers of Russian forces in Georgia, against the will of the Government, is one of those. So is the recent Russian decision to move missiles into Georgia, which we believe to be a dangerous move that is clearly in violation of the ceasefire agreement between Presidents Medvedev and Sarkozy. The recognition by Russia of the so-called independence of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is also unacceptable to NATO Allies. So as you can see, over Georgia – and by the way, also over the continued presence of Russian military assets in Moldova – we cannot see eye to eye.

But we cannot let this paralyze everything. It is counterproductive for everyone. We must and will continue to stand on the point of principle of host-nation consent – which, as I mentioned, is part of the CFE package. Here too, there is potential for positive reinforcement.

If conventional arms control in Europe is to move forward, it can only do so if host-nation consent is respected. That’s fundamental. And it applies to Georgia as much as to any other country. There is no way around it. Which is why I think that the shared desire to see progress on CFE can help energise efforts to unfreeze the deadlock over Georgia, in a way that fully respects host-nation consent and Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

2010-09-12T09:32:00.001+02:00

APPLICATION OF AGENT-BASED MODEL IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN AFGHANISTAN

Agent-based model is a proposal for security practitioners as well as a tool for capacity building which could give more responsibility to Afghans for their own affairs just after the nine-year war with Taliban. The proposed model follows a concept of counter-insurgency in framework of security sector reform. It comes out of cognition that the application is about understanding how realistically planners analyze the change of security environment. The analysis highlighted tangible and observable way to assess security environment by local (Afghan) security sector institutions. Such adaptive model provides architecture which allows facilitating Karzai`s Afghan Government with wide range of operational agent networks. The model explicates some political (tribal), and social aspects of the non-combatant population and hinge on the competence of local security forces when reconciliation starts. The security sector management may use uncertainty absorption in advance to avoid turmoil once the NATO-led forces withdraw from the country.

Read more in Policy Paper prepared especially for 5th GLOBSEC Security Conference by JOZEF ULIAN, Slovak Researcher in Security, at : http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2010/uploads/documents/Jozef%20Ulian%20-%20Application%20of%20Agent-Base%20Model%20in%20Security%20Sector%20Reform%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf

2010-09-11T12:29:00.001+02:00

AFGHAN COORDINATING UNIT - WHY AND HOW

It is mandatory for NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to create a “Bridging Organization” (Afghan Coordinating Unit - ACU) that will have a lasting presence. It must not be established as a “Token” gesture, but as a fully endowed operational entity capable of planning, implementing, clearing, and Coordinating “all” operations both within Afghanistan and the extended Region. Within the Afghan Coordination Unit, the first step in planning will be the recognition, identification, and quantification of all the problems. The Military and Security needs are another class of problems. To be successful, a third category — cross-border and other third-party problems — must be integrated into the planning. This last will require serious inputs and actions from the Intelligence Agencies of many countries.

Read more in Policy Paper prepared especially for 5th GLOBSEC Security Conference by ABDUL JALIL GHAFOORY, Embassy of Afghanistan to the United States, at : http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2010/uploads/documents/Abdul%20Jalil%20Ghafoory%20-%20Afghan%20Coordinating%20Unit%20-%20Why%20and%20How.pdf

2010-09-10T14:17:00.003+02:00

VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HAVE TO STRENGHTEN THEIR OWN CAPABILITIES

Exactly the Visegrad countries, thanks to their lessons learned, can offer to countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe their experience. If Visegrad countries wish to have the Western Balkans or its Eastern border stable, then first of all the themselves have to be strong and stable and thereby naturally inspiring and prestigious for this region. Our homework therefore is to do our best so that our countries - V4 countries – would be the most useful NATO and EU members.

Being a member is much more demanding than becoming a member. This have to be extended by strengthening our own capabilities in the largest sense of meaning – starting with economy via civic society up to defence capabilities. Earning membership does not mean it is all over, on the contrary, it is the beginning. However, nongovernmental as well as governmental partners in these areas are frequently focusing only on the goal of becoming a member, and they focus much less on being a member.

Read more in Policy Paper prepared especially for 5th GLOBSEC Security Conference by ZBYNEK PAVLACIK, Chairman of Jagello 2000- Association for Euro- Atlantic Cooperation(Ostrava), Czech ATA, at: http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2010/uploads/documents/Zbynek%20Pavlacik%20-%20Visegrad%20Countries%20Have%20to%20Strengthen%20Their%20Own%20Capabilities.pdf

Riga Conference live broadcast...now

2010-09-10T14:14:00.004+02:00

On September 10-11, 2010, Rīga, the capital of Latvia, will host one of the leading security forums in Northern Europe – the Rīga Conference. The conference has become the most significant gathering of some of the most respected world thinkers, academics, commentators, journalists, and politicians, providing a platform for a broad intellectual exchange on the current Transatlantic agenda.

To engage broader audience across the Transatlantic, live broadcast of the discussions will be available on homepage of the Rīga Conference 2010 or by clicking here. Broadcast will commence on September 10, 16:00 (CET + 1 h).

Broadcast will be supplemented by online discussion where participants will be able to discuss topics of the Rīga Conference and post questions to the panelists. Most interesting comments and challenging questions will be forwarded to the moderator of discussion panel. Online broadcast program will include discussion panels and additional exclusive interviews for our on-line audience only.

Follow the news on http://www.rigaconference.lv/press-info/press-events. Please note that Night Owl sessions are closed for any broadcast or press coverage, thus will not be available online.

2010-09-09T12:21:00.002+02:00

THE FALSE CHOICE BETWEEN “HOME” AND “AWAY” MISSIONS

There don´t have to be a kind of choice between applying Article 5 and out-of-area operations, because they go hand in hand. Today, without a single overriding threat, differences in geography and history will push allies towards different conclusions about risks to their territory. Doubts over NATO’s commitment to defend Central Europe drain support in the region for ISAF. Reassurance measures can arrest the trend. The alliance needs to find the resources to guarantee a successful reinforcement in case of a crisis; mutual defence is the NATO’s core purpose.

New allies are anxious because, in their mind, NATO has ceased to function as crisis manager in Europe. But NATO should also create a mechanism that would monitor crises on NATO's borders – not just those with Russia but all borders. Finally, the alliance needs to be able to address the needs of both types of missions at the same time. The key to its continued validity lies in being able to convincingly address multiple challenges at the same time.

Read more in Policy Paper prepared especially for 5th GLOBSEC Security Conference by TOMAS VALASEK, Director of foreign policy and defence of the Centre for European Reform (London) and Chairman of the Slovak Group of Experts on the new NATO´s Strategic Concept of the project STRATCON 2010 at:http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2010/uploads/documents/Tomas%20Valasek%20-%20The%20False%20Choice%20Between%20Home%20and%20Away%20Missions.pdf

Visit at the CIMIC Group South

2010-09-08T11:46:00.006+02:00

Last 16^th March 2010 the Youth Atlantic Club of Gorizia, YATA Italy, carried out an interesting activity thanks to the collaboration of the CIMIC Group South unit, located in Motta di Livenza in the district of Treviso, Italy.

The CIMIC Group South represents the only Operational Cimic Headquarters within NATO and is the only military unit capable of developing and carrying out activities of Civil – Military Cooperation within NATO’s southern flank. It was created on the 1^st January 2002 with the participation of Greece, Hungary, Portugal and Romania – which joined in 2007. The CIMIC activity represents a high level of cooperation within the framework of NATO where military units from different contributing nations work together with other Governmental Organizations, International Organizations and Non Governmental Organizations to cooperate in restoring essential services to countries that have been affected by natural disasters, wars or other state of emergencies.

The cooperation programme was carried out during the Functional Specialist Cimic Course (15^th -19^th March 2010). This course, together with the NATO CIMIC Basic Course, are the two main courses provided by the CIMIC Group South, open to both military and civil personnel and offering theoretical formation and professional training in the field of civil-military cooperation. (for more information visit its website: http://www.cimicgroupsouth.org).

The day was divided into two main periods, following the activities scheduled in the programme for the attendees. During the morning we first followed two lessons regarding cultural awareness and negotiation, and then some of the personnel prepared only for us an interesting description of the CIMIC unit. They gave us an outline of its position within NATO structures, its role and the specific tasks of its personnel in the war/crisis theatres, and the activities provided regularly on the base in Motta di Livenza, as an international benchmark in the NATO CIMIC field. In the afternoon activities of simulation in specific scenarios were scheduled. First we listened to an explanation of the scenarios they would play and then we watched a simulation were the attendees were asked to deal with the local authorities asking for help and support of the military detail.

After that the personnel of CIMIC reserved a place for us as role players in the second simulation scheduled for the day. We had to simulate a meeting with the military and civil personnel personifying the representatives of a NGO complaining about actions taken by them that had disturbed our work in the area. The aim was to put them in a spot and to lead the argument to a negotiation in order to solve the deadlock and reach a positive compromise.

That day represented a really unique moment for that group of students, for many reasons. First of all they had the opportunity to enter into direct contact with the world of the army and to observe the work of our Italian military personnel in a multinational framework. Secondly, they had the chance to discover what the civil-military cooperation really is, its particular characteristics, its small but important place in the crisis theatres and its role within NATO’s lead operations. Moreover, they also got to become familiar with the only Operational Cimic Headquarters within NATO and its team of professionals at work: they had the opportunity to sit in on some of the lessons and to take active part in the activities with them.

All of this was possible thanks to the kind availability of the CIMIC personnel that with a hearty welcome have opened their doors to the students, not only letting them share in the activities, but also trusting in them by giving them a part as role players for a simulation.

The students were all enthusiastic of the stimulating and exciting experiences that were new to them. They showed that they learned a lot from the visit itself, from what they had seen, heard and felt, and also from the previous preparation, for which they had to concentrate on studying for their role in the simulation and to learn how a counterpart to our military personnel in a real scenario of crisis would react.

Article by Atlantic Club of Friuli Venezia Giulia, Italy.

2010-09-07T15:37:00.002+02:00

ALL NECESSARY MEANS? GETTING AFPAK RIGHT

What will be needed to make AFPAK work is something the British understood only too well in the nineteenth century – fighting power, staying power and paying power. The AFPAK strategy has eight essential principles which include an international approach, a regional approach, a joint civil-military approach, a better co-ordinated approach, and a long-term approach. However, the weaknesses of the strategy reflect the essential paradox of the position taken by the Americans and the wider West. AFPAK is a big place fractured into a thousand hatreds. For strategy to succeed requires a commitment to success that is normally only seen during major war.

Therefore, in September 2010 severe questions remain given the financial and economic challenges faced by many Allied governments as to whether sufficient staying power and paying power is likely to be generated, let alone fighting power. Is the West still collectively prepared to invest politically or financially at a higher level of effort at a crucial moment? What to do?

Read more in Policy Paper prepared especially for 5th GLOBSEC Security Conference by JULIAN LINDLEY- FRENCH Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy at:

http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2010/uploads/documents/Prof.%20Julian%20Lindley-French%20-%20All%20Necessary%20Means%20-%20Getting%20AFPAK%20Right.pdf

2010-09-05T12:51:00.003+02:00

REGIONAL SECURITY INTEGRATION: NORDIC AND VISEGRAD EXPERIENCE

The origin of the Visegrad cooperation was to transform this group from a NATO membership-delaying group into a NATO membership promoting pressure group, and it worked. However, the European Union accession talks did not favor such cooperation, since the Commission followed – rightly so – a strictly bilateral approach and in the process of joining. Security, where the interests still were close to each other, hardly played any role in the accession process.

Since accession to EU in 2004, there were occasions, where the Visegrad countries acted together, but Several security issues, like the relationship to Russia proved even divisive: the Visegrad countries were as divided as the NATO and the European Union. On the other hand, the some successes of the Visegrad cooperation within the European Union in last years opened the eyes of these leaders to recognize that common initiatives and/or support to individual or partially supported initiatives by the other Visegrad countries are tremendously helpful.

Read more in Policy Paper prepared especially for 5th GLOBSEC Security Conference by Amb. ISTVÁN GYARMATI, President and CEO of the International Centre for Democratic Transition (Budapest) at:

http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2010/uploads/documents/Amb.%20Istvan%20Gyarmati%20-%20Regional%20Security%20Integration%20-%20Nordic%20and%20Visegrad%20Experience.pdf

Kosovo offers to bury differences with Serbia

2010-09-04T14:07:00.000+02:00

The prime minister of Kosovo, which seceded from Serbia and declared independence two years ago, has offered to make a fresh start in relations with Belgrade, which is coming under increasing European pressure to respond in kind.

In an article for the Guardian's Comment is free, Hashim Thaçi said it was "inevitable" that Kosovo and Serbia would resolve their deep enmity, bury their differences, and look to a future integrated in the European Union (EU).

The call for new negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade followed a blunt warning to the Serbian government this week from the foreign secretary, William Hague, who said the Serbs were jeopardising their chances of joining the EU by refusing to deal with an independent Kosovo.

The Serbs have tabled a draft resolution, to be discussed next week at the United Nations in New York, calling for Kosovo's secession to be condemned.

Hague told the Serbian president, Boris Tadic, to ditch the resolution. If he refused, Serbia's application to join the EU would be in trouble, Hague warned. If Tadic agreed, Britain would be Serbia's biggest backer in seeking to join the EU. Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister, delivered a similar message in Belgrade last week.

Thaçi appeared to be responding to the growing calls from Brussels and west European capitals for the opening of new talks between Belgrade and Pristina.

"My country looks forward to working with Serbia and discussing practical issues that would improve the lives of all of our citizens," Thaçi said. "We are neighbours and we face common challenges. Our Serbian neighbours may not recognise Kosovo's independence just yet, but cooperation between the two independent states is inevitable."

The International Court of Justice dealt Serbie a blow in July, rejecting a demand from Belgrade to declare Kosovo's independence against international law.

Hague told the Serbs it was time to end recriminations from the outcome of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, to accept the new reality, and to focus on the future, with eventual EU membership.

Serbia has applied to join, but Brussels has yet to rule on opening negotiations. Membership is years away and improbable unless Serbia recognises an independent Kosovo, something it has vowed never to do.

Nato went to war against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999. The territory, populated mainly by ethnic Albanians, was then put under UN stewardship, leading to the declaration of independence in 2008. Serbia refuses to accept that. But Thaçi complimented Tadic. "Today's Serbian government," he said, "has a different complexion from the one that terrorised my people 11 years ago."

Hague said the map of the Balkans, redrawn in the 1990s as a result of the wars and the collapse of Yugoslavia, was now complete and would not be re-opened, meaning Kosovo's fate was settled and there could be no Serbian secession in Bosnia.

2010-09-03T10:20:00.002+02:00

THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: TWILIGHT OF TRANSFORMATION?

Early in the twenty-first century, there is a general feeling that the primacy of the transatlantic economy is in its twilight. Given the global weight of the transatlantic partnership, disputes and disagreements between the United States and Europe invariably take on global dimensions. Against this backdrop, the world cannot afford the transatlantic economy to fail, which makes the all the transatlantic bickering since the crisis began all the more discouraging. The current economic crisis presents a unique opportunity for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to rewrite and reconfigure some of the basic fundamentals of the transatlantic economy. Only strong cooperation and coordinated response to the global crisis would underpin and support the transatlantic economy’s role as one of the most important components of the global economy.

Read more in Policy Paper prepared especially for 5th GLOBSEC Security Conference by JOSEPH QUINLAN, Chief Market Strategist of Bank of America Capital Management, at: http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2010/uploads/documents/Joseph%20Quinlan%20-%20The%20Transatlantic%20Partnership.pdf

2010-09-01T12:08:00.002+02:00

GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

The speed with which the financial crisis that originated in the USA has spread into the rest of the world has shown how interdependent the world is. The financial crisis followed by the economic and social crisis has not triggered trade wars but was a strong blow to globalisation through protectionism, hostility towards foreign investors and immigration. On the positive side, it strengthened efforts to improve global governance to prevent recurrence of such crisis. G20 emerged as a new global economic governance body.

The crisis has speeded up the process towards multipolar world by accelerating the shift of much of the economic power from the G7 to the rest of the G20 countries with China and India as the two new world powers. The crisis generated sharp increase in unemployment, inequalities, extreme poverty that are often drivers of social unrest, political instability, regime change, increase in xenophobia, extremism, organised crime and terrorism. However, so far there has not been any big threat to international security indicating that global coordination in crisis response has succeeded in preventing the worst.

Read more in Policy Paper prepared especially for 5th GLOBSEC Security Conference by BRIGITA SCHMOGNEROVA, former Vice- President for Environment, Procurement and Administration at the European Bank For Reconstruction and Development (London) at : http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2010/uploads/documents/Brigita%20Schmognerova%20-%20Geopolitical%20Consequence%20of%20the%20Economic%20Crisis.pdf

2010-08-30T11:13:00.003+02:00

ENERGY SECURITY OF EUROPE AND NATO

Unhindered access to energy resources is of vital importance to the wellbeing of national economy. It is one of the necessary conditions for the ability of state to provide basic services, as well as a fundamental requirement for state to maintain its economic, but also political sovereignty. The different degree of energy dependencies affect both the dynamics of relations and the nature of national sovereignty within the EU and the Alliance. Energy security, nonetheless, remains contested priority among NATO members. Can NATO as an organization contribute to the Energy security of Europe?

Energy security is primarily domestic responsibility of each and every Member of the alliance and no state can or should be relying on the provision of their security by others in order to free-ride and reduce the necessary investment into defence, or energy security. NATO is an excellent platform for developing and sharing of best practices as well as for cooperation and coordination in research and coping with energy security threats. Alliance members can use the existing Article IV to improve the resilience and protect their critical infrastructure.

Read more in Policy Paper prepared especially for 5th GLOBSEC Security Conference by ANDREJ NOSKO, Researcher in Energy Security, at :

http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2010/uploads/documents/Andrej%20Nosko%20-%20Energy%20Security%20of%20Europe%20and%20NATO.pdf

2010-08-28T12:49:00.006+02:00

Per angusta ad augusta:

an outlook for EU and NATO relations

The way to the current state of affairs of EU-NATO relations has been long and winding. The official view from NATO is given by its current Strategic Concept dating from 1999. But in 2009 NATO’s Heads of State and Government issued the Declaration on Alliance Solidarity. In comparison with the Strategic Concept of 1999 it speaks very differently on the topic of cooperation with the EU. On one hand the text acknowledges what the Europeans have achieved in developing ESDP into a policy capable of delivering operational results, on the other hand it implies that non-EU Allies are not being involved to an appropriate level in this development. The next opportunity to move forward on the “document frontline” will be the drafting of the new Strategic Concept in the North Atlantic Council. Later this year, NATO’s Secretary General in his Strategic Concept draft proposal should be much careful how to develop the possibilities of a truly strategic partnership with the EU.

Read more in Policy Paper prepared especially for 5th GLOBSEC Security Conference by JAROSLAV NAĎ (Director General, Ministry of Defense of Slovak Republic) and MARTIN SKLENÁR (analyst, UNMIK) available at:

http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2010/uploads/documents/Martin%20Sklenar%20and%20Jaroslav%20Nad%20-%20Per%20Angusta%20Ad%20Augusta%20-%20An%20Outlook%20for%20EU%20and%20NATO%20Relations.pdf

Common approaches of V4 countries in security- mission impossible?

2010-08-17T13:56:00.003+02:00

Experts from three ATA associations (Slovak, Czech and Polish) and International Centre for Democratic Transition (Hungary) prepared second Policy Paper as an outcome of the project of Slovak Atlantic Commission "Visegrad Security Cooperation Initiative" (VSCI). The authors of the document agreed on the necessity of working out common V4 foreign policy strategies in the field security.

For experts, cooperation of Nordic countries can serve as a very good example of regional cooperation. Cooperation in domain of security among Central European countries is even more promising since in V4 there are much more similar approaches to security than in Nordic countries. You can find Policy Paper with recommendations to common approaches of V4 countries to transatlantic security at:
http://www.ata-sac.org/subory/file/VSCI%20Paper%201%20Trans-Atlantic%20Security.pdf

Visegrad Security Cooperation Initiative (VSCI)- Energy Security

2010-08-16T11:17:00.002+02:00

What should V4 countries do to have more effective energy security? Guidelines were drawn upon in recommendations to decision structures at relevant ministries of Visegrad countries by the Slovak Atlantic Commission as the outcome of Visegrad Security Cooperation Initiative (VSCI). The project was organised by the Slovak Atlantic Commission in first half of 2010 altogether with partners mainly from ATA: Jagello 2000 (Czech republic), International Centre for Democratic Transition (Hungary) and Euro – Atlantic Association (Poland) and financially supported by the International Visegrad Fund. You can find now the Policy Paper on energy security at http://www.ata-sac.org/subory/file/VSCI_Energy_Security.pdf

Bratislava Security Conference 2010 (GLOBSEC)

2010-08-15T20:05:00.003+02:00

On September 13 - 14, 2010, the Slovak Atlantic Commission will organise 5th annual GLOBSEC Bratislava Security Conference. The GLOBSEC is the most important international security conference in Central Europe, taking place annually in Bratislava, gathering more than 250 guests: Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Defense of NATO and EU members states, decision- makers, opinion- makers, distinct analysts and journalists both from the region and Euro- Atlantic area. This year, GLOBSEC conference includes 7 panel discussions, 2 Night Owl Sessions and catches upon the hottest topics of international security and foreign policy with strong accent on transatlanticism and regional dimension with high level participation.

Speakers of the conference will discuss global ambitions of „post- Lisbon Europe“, consequences of the economic crisis for global security, future prospects of Ukraine and Moldova, European perspective of Bosnia, regional security cooperation between Nordic and Visegrad countries, new NATO´s Strategic concept, values and interests of the new Euro - Atlantic security architecture and finally overview of the developments in Afghanistan. To see agenda and speakers of the conference please visit www.globsec.org or join GLOBSEC Bratislava Security Conference on Facebook.

Afghanistan at the Italian Foreign Policy Forum

2010-07-28T16:11:00.009+02:00

Afghanistan has been one of the key topics of discussion at the First Foreign Policy Forum, organized by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 28th 2010. The Forum, divided into six panels, discussed the most pressing issues of Italian Foreign Policy: economic foreign policy, transatlantic relations, European Union, global partnerships, 'new' Middle East and Afghanistan.

Following the March 2010 Af-Pak Strategy, the appointment of a new ISAF Commander, the July 20th Kabul International Conference and the Wikileaks disclosures (which - apparently - were already well know within the experts community!), Afghan war is in a crucial phase.

The panel on Afghanistan was participated by the Afghan Ambassador to Italy, Amb. Musa Maroofi, Russian Federation Ambassador to Italy, Amb. Alexey Meshkov and by Attilio Massimo Iannucci, Special Representative of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The panel has been moderated by Franco Venturini, journalist at Corriere della Sera, one of the major Italian daily newspapers.

Attilio Massimo Iannucci highlighted the stabilizing role of economic development and the contribution that civil-military cooperation can bring forward in this field. "Civilian reconstruction efforts are the reason for not leaving Afghanistan to its own destiny", Iannucci said, echoed by Afghan Ambassador.

Economic development, indeed, is a crucial tool to hinter insurgents sources of recruitment, since many support the cause in return of a daily sum to survive. With other sources of income available, many insurgents will not find a reason for participating to the insurgency.

The economic development is greatly supported by civil-military cooperation, which has operated in three different sectors: direct assistance to people in need, especially at the beginning of the ISAF operations when most basic needs needed to be addressed, education and training of local officers and economic cooperation.

As leading nation of the Regional Command West, Italian troops, NGOs and civilians experts from the local Provincial Reconstruction Team are now concentrating on the last two sectors, with a special focus on a National Justice Programme and on the education and training of Borders and Customs Police officers.

Training has been intensively pursued by Italian experts and authorities. 20 high officers from the Borders and Custom Police Department have been trained in Italy, along with other bilateral and multilateral training opportunities for Afghan police officers and military personnel.

Furthermore, a group of afghan marble entrepreneurs was invited to visit the Italian marble district of Carrara, since a flourished marble industry around Herat existed in the past and it has survived 30 years of war. Until now, tough, marble was extracted with controlled explosion making it a dangerous and product-wasting process. With support from Italian companies, several marble-cut machineries will be delivered to Afghan companies, making it possible to local entrepreneurs to imporve thier production and cut costs.

"The international community has greatly contributed to Afghan economic development, but much importance must be given to the investment flows to and from the country", Iannucci said.

Therefore we can assume that security will improve if economic development will continue. Only then, there will be less need for military support and increasingly more need for civilian expertise.

AFGHANISTAN AT A CROSSROADS by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General

2010-07-22T16:51:00.002+02:00

[Today, Tuesday July 20th 2010] the Afghan capital Kabul will host a unique event. An International Conference on Afghanistan will bring together more than 70 countries, international and regional organisations and financial institutions to support a plan for development, governance, and stability. The meeting will result in a clear way forward for the transition to Afghan responsibility and ownership. In short, it will be a milestone in the process by which Afghans are finally becoming masters of their own house.

This new political momentum has not come about by happenstance. It is the result of a sustained effort both by Afghans and the international community to give this country a new lease on life. The tragedy of “9/11” was a wake-up call for all of us. Indifference was no longer an option. Engagement was our only choice. Leaving Afghanistan to its own devices would have spelled more instability there, and more terrorist attacks worldwide.

There is no denying that the international community initially underestimated the magnitude of the challenge. After nine years of international engagement, it has become painfully obvious that the price we have to pay is much higher than expected – most of all in the loss of life of international and Afghan soldiers.

But Afghanistan is finally moving in the right direction. Maybe the insurgents think they can wait us out, but we will stay for as long as it takes to finish our job. Our training of Afghan soldiers and police is ahead of schedule, and by next year there will be the 300.000 afghan security forces – and they can’t be waited out.

By sending 40.000 additional international troops, we have demonstrated our commitment to protecting the Afghan people by holding areas we have liberated from the insurgents.

We are also finally taking the fight to the Taliban where it hurts them the most. Over the past months, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has launched military offensives into Taliban heartland – Helmand and Kandahar. These operations, in which the Afghan security forces play an important role, will inevitably lead to intensified fighting. Regrettably there will be more casualties. But these military actions are of tremendous political importance. They contribute to the marginalisation of the Taliban as a political and military force. And this will encourage many who joined the Taliban to quit their ranks and engage in the reconciliation effort.

Reconciliation, however, is no blank cheque. Renunciation of violence and respect for the Afghan constitution, including women’s rights, is a precondition for successful reintegration. The Afghan authorities know this, and we will keep reminding them.

The next important political step after the Kabul Conference will be the parliamentary elections in September. Several times since the fall of the Taliban terror regime, Afghans have flocked to the ballot boxes. Despite death threats, they have voted in large numbers. Nothing could illustrate better the desire of the Afghan people to take their future into their own hands. NATO-led forces will support these elections, but the overall responsibility for their security and their free and fair conduct will lie with the Afghans themselves.

All these developments point in the same direction: a gradual transition to Afghan lead. This transition will not be done on the basis of an artificial timetable. It will be done on the basis of clear assessments of the political and security situation in each area. Where and when we do it, it will be irreversible.

Starting the transition does not mean that the struggle for Afghanistan’s future as a stable country in a volatile region will be over. Even when our forces move into a supporting role, Afghanistan will need the continued support of the international community, including NATO. It is important that we send a clear message of long-term commitment. And the Afghan population needs to know that we will continue to stand by them as they are charting their own course into the future.

To underline this commitment, I believe that NATO should develop a long-term cooperation agreement with the Afghan Government. Such a partnership will give Afghanistan even more self-confidence as it is again taking control of its own fate.

We now have a new commander of the ISAF mission, General David Petraeus. But our strategy hasn’t changed, because it is the right one. Our objective is clear: to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorism. We are building Afghans’ ability to resist terrorism and extremism on their own. We are changing the political conditions in the key strategic areas of Afghanistan; we are protecting the population; we are strengthening the capability of the elected government; and we are training the Afghan army, to enable Afghanistan to look after its own security. If we and our Afghan partners stick to our strategy and give it time to work, it will.

Germany's armed forces: At ease

2010-07-15T21:41:00.000+02:00

Conscription, a staple of Germany’s post-war identity, may be on the way out

SOMETIME between their 18th and 23rd birthdays nearly all German men will be summoned to one of 59 induction centres to be weighed, measured and evaluated. Nearly half will be deemed unfit to serve in the armed forces. Of the rest, the greatest part will opt out, choosing instead the non-military “community service”. In the end some 70,000 men a year are called up for a nine-month stint in the Bundeswehr. (Women are exempt from the draft.) Germany has held to conscription long after most European countries abolished it (most recently Sweden, on July 1st). The “citizen in uniform, anchored in society” is part of the country’s post-war identity.

It may soon be no longer. This month the German legislature passed a law shortening the tour of duty from nine months to six. That was the result of an awkward compromise between the partners in the ruling coalition. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sibling, the Christian Social Union (CSU), consider conscription a “cornerstone” of society. The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) thinks it a “massive intervention in young people’s freedom,” says Elke Hoff, an FDP deputy in the Bundestag. Cutting conscription back to six months may be a prelude to dispensing with it altogether. “There are so many disadvantages” to the truncated service “that you can’t keep it going long term,” says Hilmar Linnenkamp of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, a think-tank in Berlin.

The main justification for the draft—the threat of invasion by a conventional army—disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is wobbling now because of two newer developments. The first is that money, always in short supply, is drying up. The government’s new €80 billion ($102 billion) savings package includes €8.3 billion of cuts to the defence budget over four years. The second is that the defence minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, an energetic sort with the air of a cavalry officer, relishes smashing taboos, or at least threatening to. Old problems are getting fresh looks.

The biggest is that the Bundeswehr is not set up for the tasks that await it. With just 6,700 of its 250,000 troops deployed abroad it is “at the limit” of its capacity, says Mr zu Guttenberg. The Bundeswehr does not aspire to be like the American or British armies, which have expeditionary traditions and can keep a much bigger share of their soldiers in the field. But to be a more useful ally, Germany will have to do better. The Bundeswehr still spends billions on weapons ordered during the cold war that are virtually useless against elusive insurgents like the Taliban.

Some changes have been made. The Bundeswehr is half the size it was at the end of the cold war and is the third-largest provider of troops to the NATO-led force in Afghanistan. But it has not changed enough. Mr zu Guttenberg wants it to be “more professional, faster and more flexible” and able to “deploy our soldiers anywhere in the world,” he told Der Spiegel.

Conscription is an obstacle to this. Draftees cannot be deployed abroad. They cost the Bundeswehr some €400m a year; training and organising them ties up an estimated 10,000-20,000 professional soldiers who could otherwise be employed more usefully. Mr zu Guttenberg, although a member of the conscription-loving CSU, wants to end the draft, but he has yet to persuade fellow conservatives or say what will replace it.

It will be traumatic if it happens. The draft is anchored in the constitution, which is why reformers talk of “suspending” rather than abolishing it. To its defenders, it is the best way to attract the sort of recruits the armed forces are looking for: not born warriors drawn to violence but thoughtful folk with varied talents who can win over local populations even as they hunt terrorists. Roughly half the soldiers on longer contracts come to the Bundeswehr via the draft; in general they are the better half, says Ulrich Kirsch, head of the BundeswehrVerband, a group that represents soldiers’ interests.

Follow the inner leader

Germans associate the draft with innere Führung, or “inner leadership”, the notion that a soldier should be guided by Germany’s constitutional principles rather than robotically follow orders, especially immoral ones. After unification, conscription helped to re-educate a generation of young East German men who had grown up thinking of democratic West Germany as the enemy.

But as the glue that binds soldiers to their fellow citizens conscription is losing its hold. It has already been shortened from 18 months in the 1960s to nine and now a vestigial six, half of which will be spent training. The downsizing of the armed forces has reduced the demand for conscripts. Refusal in favour of community service is easy. Now only about 15% of young men are called up. Once, the Bundeswehr was a topic of conversation at the family table and the local bar, says Berthold Meyer of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt. No longer.

Mr zu Guttenberg’s ideas for conscription will be part of a reform package he is expected to propose in September. It is likely to include a reduction in the overall size of the Bundeswehr, possibly to as few as 150,000 troops (the “extreme model”, says the minister), and cutbacks in weapons purchases. The armed forces are overloaded with civilian personnel and top-heavy with officers. Mr zu Guttenberg has created a “structural commission” to suggest solutions.

His radicalism may be curbed. Every base he would close and programme he would trim has a lobby to defend it. A decision to end conscription might require approval by the party conventions of the CDU and CSU. Even if his boldest ideas get through that will not be the final word. The European Union’s 27 armies have barely begun claiming the savings that would come from pooling resources and sharing tasks. Defence reform, the dashing Mr zu Guttenberg will discover, is a war of attrition, not a cavalry charge.

Reset at Sea: US-NATO-Russian Cooperation in the Struggle against Piracy

2010-07-01T10:41:00.000+02:00

Piracy has a long history and the struggle with it is closely tied to concepts of national sovereignty, freedom of the seas, and the protection of life and property at sea. In 1609, Hugo Grotius, (1583-1645), the great Dutch legal theorist, provided the legal foundation for making piracy unlawful. In his book, Mare Liberum (Free Ocean) he argued that the ocean belonged to no one state and all were free to use oceanic routes for trade or passenger traffic. Those who attacked shipping outside of a state of war between two sovereign states were no more than bandits at sea and subject to repression by any naval forces that came upon them. International law did recognize the right of warring states to conduct guerre de course (raids upon the opponent's merchant shipping by warships and armed merchantmen acting as privateers under a letter of marque and reprisal granted by his sovereign). By the mid-19th century, the European powers had agreed to abolish privateering, The US Constitution still lists issuing letters of marque and reprisal as part of the enumerated powers of congress. Yet, apart from unsuccessful efforts to persuade congress to issue letters of marque and reprisal in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, no modern application has been made. Instead, the civilized world has accepted the concept that piracy defined as robbery and illegal violence at sea is a threat to maritime commerce.

While piracy has persisted on the margins of world trade, the recent pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden have brought the problem back to global attention. Since 2005, the International Maritime Organization has called for efforts to combat piracy in this area. The fact that Somalia is a failed state torn apart by on-going civil war, set the stage for this 21st century piracy. A weak national government in Somalia, locked in an on-going struggle with opposing Islamic forces has been unable to establish de facto sovereignty over the rest of Somalia, while the autonomous province of Puntland has become the most important base for pirate operations along the coast. These pirates are not interested in seizing cargoes for disposition, but seek to hijack vessels and hold their crews for ransom, which is frequently paid out, making piracy big business.

In 2006 Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, which was composed of naval forces conducting counter-terrorism off the Horn of Africa, began anti-piracy operations from their base at Djibouti. Other countries joined the struggle. In June 2008, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution condemning piracy and robbery at sea and authorized the application of all means necessary to suppress such acts. These efforts sought to apply existing maritime law, international law, and national laws (which limits them to having jurisdiction over their own citizens), to deal with these attacks on merchant ships. The initial goal of naval operations against these pirates is to “deter and disrupt” their activities, to detain, interrogate, and disarm pirates. However, these actions would then culminate in the pirates' release. In the absence of an international tribunal to prosecute pirates, naval powers could not dissuade pirates (who did not face trial and punishment for their actions) from continuing their activities which continued to be profitable at low risk. In January 2009, the US provided the leadership to create CTF 151 as an international naval force to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. However, as a consequence of this legal gap, the number of pirate attacks in 2009 increased to 214 vessels with 47 being hijacked at sea. Russian naval forces began their own patrols to suppress piracy off the Horn of Africa in the fall of 2008 and have maintained a naval presence since then. Russian experts have written extensively on the problem of international maritime law and international relations (Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn’, No. 2, March 2009).

In July 2009 President, Dmitry Medvedev, proposed a solution: the creation of a separate international court to try cases of piracy (Nezavisimaia Gazeta, April 8, 2010). The response to this proposal was positive. In April of this year, the UN Security Council passed unanimously a Russian resolution calling on the UN Secretary General to provide “concrete” measures for the prosecution of pirates, including a special chamber at the national court of one of the countries in the region (RIA Novosti, April 27).

The background to the UN resolution involves increasing international frustration over the continuing pirate attacks, especially the hijacking of merchant ships, in the face of an international naval presence. The profile of Russian anti-piracy actions off the Horn of Africa increased in 2010 and took on an aspect of deeper international cooperation. On March 4, Krasnaia Zvezda announced that the Commander-in-Chief of Russian Naval Forces, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskii, discussed anti-piracy cooperation with the Chief of Staff of the French Navy, Admiral Pierre-François Forissier. The article went on to explore the global response to the threat of piracy and noted Russia’s ongoing commitment of naval forces to the task (Krasnaia Zvezda, March 4). On March 12, Russian warships involved in anti-piracy operations began formal cooperation with CTF 151 when the Russian ASW Frigate, Neustrashimy, from the Baltic Fleet met the USN destroyer, Farragut, off the Horn of Africa. The Russian captain of the Neustrashimy met with the Commander of CTF-151, Rear Admiral Bernard Miranda (USN), to discuss coordinating anti-piracy activities between Russian and CTF-151 naval forces (Krasnaia Zvezda, March 13). On the same day the Russian Rescue Tug, SB-36 from the Black Sea Fleet escorted the Thai fishing trawler, Union-3, when the vessel and its crew were freed from pirates off the Seychelles Islands after reportedly paying a $3 million ransom. Among the crew of the fishing trawler were 22 Russian seamen. The Union-3 had been seized in late October 2009 (Izvestia, March 9).

Russian naval activities in support of anti-piracy operations have increased in intensity and deepened in terms of international cooperation since March. On May 5, Somali pirates attacked and seized the Liberian-flagged and Russian owned tanker, Moscow University, in the Indian Ocean about 350 miles east of the Gulf of Aden. The ship’s crew was able to report the seizure, disable the ship’s engines, and lock themselves in the rudder compartment. A NATO helicopter located the hijacked ship, and the Russian cruiser, Marshal Shaposhnikov, raced to intercept the tanker early the following morning. The Somali pirates fired on the Marshal Shaposhnikov’s helicopter and its captain, certain of the crew’s safety, ordered his vessel to fire on the tanker and sent a boarding party of naval infantry to recapture it. In the ensuing fight one pirate was killed. The crew was rescued, and the ten remaining pirates disarmed, placed under arrest, and interrogated before being released to their boat. Since the vessel was sailing under a Liberian flag, Russia could not prosecute the captured pirates. The Staff of the Russian Pacific Fleet noted the assistance of the NATO helicopter in the operation and called the action a good example of international cooperation (Novaia Gazeta, Izvestia, May 7).

Evidence of deepening naval cooperation in the struggle against the Somali pirates was shortly forthcoming. On May 5, NATO Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, agreed to include Russia-NATO cooperation in the struggle against Somali pirates as part of a plan of military-to-military cooperation for 2010 (ARMS-TASS, May 5). During the same period President Medvedev signed a decree imposing an arms sales embargo on Somalia (Voenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, May 5-11).

Just over one week later the Marshal Shaposhnikov visited the port of Djibouti and the representative of the Djibouti navy announced that Russian warships involved in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden would be allowed to use that port as a base of operations (Vzgliad, May 17). On May 24 the Russia-NATO Council discussed cooperation in the struggle against Somali pirates (Kommersant, May 20). At the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Riga, Latvia, the Russian delegation composed of members of the State Duma had the usual issue of concerns to raise (Russian military doctrine, NATO’s expansion, the continuing dispute over the territorial integrity of Georgia). However, the Russian parliamentarians and their American counterparts found common ground for cooperation in the struggle against Somali pirates and the need to seek an international legal regime that would permit their trial upon capture (Biznes & Baltiia, June 1).

On June 2, local press in the Russian Far East reported that Russian merchant seamen were taking part in an international petition drive to persuade national governments to unite their efforts in the struggle against piracy (Vladivostok, June 2). On June 4, the Russian navy announced the deployment of a flotilla from the Pacific Fleet on a friendship visit to the US. The vessels, the cruiser Varyag, the rescue tug, Fotii Krilov, and the tanker, Boris Butoma, under the command of Rear Admiral Vladimir Kasatanov will visit San Francisco with the goal of developing “practical and friendly contacts between the Russian Navy and the US Navy.” In a review of Russian naval activities during this summer’s deployment season, the author of the article noted the continuing deployment of Russian warships off Somalia. The author noted: “The contribution of the Russian navy to the efforts of the international community in the struggle with pirates off the coasts of Somali is already highly appreciated by many influential international figures” (Krasnaia Zvezda, June 4). In this area of naval cooperation against a common threat to freedom of the seas, the US-NATO “reset” with Russia appears to be working because there are shared interests that override conflicts in other areas.

The NATO First Act Would Advance Transatlantic Security | The Heritage Foundation

2010-06-25T13:20:00.000+02:00

The NATO First Act Would Advance Transatlantic Security | The Heritage Foundation

Football and peace

2010-06-22T18:21:00.003+02:00

I believe football can help bringing people closer and leverage differences and misperceptions.

Watch the video on NATO review and take a look at some nice pictures from the past.

2010-06-21T11:38:00.000+02:00

Dear friends,

I would like to share the latest edition of YATA Newsletter with you. You can find the latest edition from here:

www.atlantic-youth.org/documents/newsletters/NewsletterJune.pdf

All the best
Antti Talonen

Value to Big Powers May Not Save Kyrgyzstan

2010-06-19T21:30:00.000+02:00

A year and a half ago, the world’s great powers were fighting like polecats over Kyrgyzstan, a landlocked stretch of mountains in the heart of Central Asia.

The United States was ferociously holding on to the Manas Air Base, a transit hub considered crucial toNATO efforts in Afghanistan. Russiawas so jealous of its traditional dominance in the region that it promised the Kyrgyz president $2.15 billion in aid the day he announced he was closing Manas. With the bidding war that followed, Kyrgyzstan could be forgiven for seeing itself as a global player.

And yet for the past week, as spasms of violence threatened to break Kyrgyzstan apart, its citizens saw their hopes for an international intervention flicker and die. With each day it has become clearer that none of Kyrgyzstan’s powerful allies — most pointedly, its former overlords in Moscow — were prepared to get involved in a quagmire.

Russia did send in several hundred paratroopers, but only to defend its air base at Kant. For the most part, the powers have evacuated their citizens, apparently content to wait for the conflict to burn itself out.

The calculus was a pragmatic one, made “without the smallest thought to the moral side of the question,” said Aleksei V. Vlasov, an expert in the politics of post-Soviet countries at Moscow State University.

“We use the phrase ‘collective responsibility,’ but in fact this is a case of collective irresponsibility,” he added. “While they were fighting about whatever — about bases, about Afghanistan — they forgot that in the south of Kyrgyzstan there was extreme danger. The city was flammable. All they needed to do was throw a match on it.” He referred to the city of Osh, which suffered days of ethnic rioting.

Kyrgyzstan might have unraveled anyway, but competition between Moscow and Washington certainly sped the process.

To lock in its claim on the base after the threat of expulsion, the United States offered President Kurmanbek S. Bakiyev $110 million to back out of his agreement with Russia, which had already paid him $450 million. Congratulating itself on its victory, Washington raised the stakes by announcing the construction of several military training facilities in Kyrgyzstan, including one in the south, which further irritated Moscow.

This spring, the Kremlin won back its lost ground, employing a range of soft-power tactics to undermine Mr. Bakiyev’s government. Mr. Bakiyev was ousted by a coalition of opposition leaders in April, and conditions in Kyrgyzstan’s south — still loyal to the old government — hurtled toward disaster.

“Let’s be honest, Kyrgyzstan is turning into a collapsing state, or at least part of it is, and what was partially responsible is this geopolitical tug of war we had,” said Alexander A. Cooley, who included Manas in a recent book about the politics of military bases. “In our attempts to secure these levers of influence and support the governing regime, we destabilized these state institutions. We are part of that dynamic.”

Last week, as pillars of smoke rose off Osh and Jalal-Abad, citizens begged for third-party peacekeepers to replace local forces they suspected of having taken part in the violence.

Roza Otunbayeva, the head of Kyrgyzstan’s interim government, asked Moscow for peacekeepers, and when that request was denied, for troops to protect strategic sites like power plants and reservoirs. She asked Washington to contribute armored vehicles from the base at Manas, which she said would be used to transport the dead and wounded, she told the Russian newspaper Kommersant.

So far, Moscow and Washington have responded mostly with humanitarian aid pledges — late on Friday, Russia’s Defense Ministry said that Ms. Otunbayeva’s request was still under consideration.

The United States, overextended in Afghanistan and Iraq, has neither the appetite nor the motivation for a new commitment. Russia, the more obvious player, sees the risks of a deployment outweighing the benefits. Russian troops would enter hostile territory in south Kyrgyzstan, where Mr. Bakiyev’s supporters blame Moscow for his overthrow, and Uzbekistan could also revolt against a Russian presence.

Mr. Vlasov, of Moscow State University, said: “Who are we separating? Uzbeks from Kyrgyz? Krygyz from Kyrgyz? Kyrgyz from some criminal element? There is no clearly defined cause of this conflict. It would be comparable to the decision the Soviet Politburo made to invade Afghanistan — badly thought through, not confirmed by the necessary analytical work.”

If the explosion of violence was a test case for the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an eight-year-old post-Soviet security group dominated by Russia, it seems to have failed, its leaders unwilling to intervene in a domestic standoff. In any case, neither the Russian public nor the county’s foreign policy establishment is pressing the Kremlin to risk sending peacekeepers.

“If you send them, you have to shoot sooner or later,” said Sergei A. Karaganov, a prominent political scientist in Moscow. “Then you are not a peacekeeper, but something else.”

Though it seems that the worst of the violence has passed, great challenges remain. Beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis is an unstable state at the heart of a dangerous region. The Ferghana Valley, bordering Afghanistan, is a minefield of religious fundamentalism, drug trafficking and ethnic hatreds.

If Kyrgyz-style violence should radiate across borders in Central Asia, the result could be a rise in Islamic militancy that would directly threaten Russia and the United States.

The failure of international institutions last week should alarm both capitals. President Obama and President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia began their relationship with the crisis over the Manas base, and as they grope toward tentative collaboration in the post-Soviet space, Kyrgyzstan has dominated their conversation.

Now, Kyrgyzstan needs help building a stable government that knits together the north and the south. Dmitri V. Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, suggested that NATO should be working with the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to develop a mechanism for collective action. The next time a Central Asian country is wobbling at the edge of a precipice, he said, someone must be prepared to accept responsibility.

“You can abstain from a local conflict in Kyrgyzstan,” Mr. Trenin said. “You can close your eyes to it — it’s bad for your conscience — but you can live with it. If something happens in Uzbekistan, you will not be able to just let it burn out.”

Invitation - 15h Portuguese Atlantic Youth Seminar

2010-06-06T20:46:00.001+02:00

Dear Esteemed Friends and Colleagues,

The Portuguese Atlantic Committee and the Portuguese Atlantic Youth Association have the immense pleasure of inviting your association to participate in this year's Portuguese Atlantic Youth Seminar (PAYS), which will be held for the fifteenth consecutive year.

This year the Seminar will be held at Sintra Air Base, near Lisbon, from the 24th (arrival) to the 31st of July (departure), under the general theme “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: road to Lisbon”.

In order to apply, get in contact with your National Chapter or contact us at secretariadoajpa@gmail.com

We look forward to hearing from you

Hungarian Prime Minister, Secretary General discuss Afghanistan, Kosovo and NATO’s future

2010-06-05T17:05:00.000+02:00

On 3 June, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán visited NATO Headquarters, where he met with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to discuss NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan and Kosovo. They also discussed the upcoming Summit in Portugal, at which Allies will agree on a new Strategic Concept for NATO.

In speaking to the press after their meeting, the Secretary General congratulated the Prime Minister for his recent electoral victory and said he looked forward to cooperating with him and his government. He also expressed appreciation for Hungary’s contribution to NATO’s operations in Kosovo as well as in Afghanistan, where he said the country is “pulling its weight” despite tough financial times.

Mr Fogh Rasmussen also stressed the importance of Hungary’s hosting of NATO’s C17 transport aircraft, which he said was a “concrete demonstration of what we can do when Allies pool together their resources.” The aircraft can be used for missions as well as humanitarian airlift or disaster relief operations if called on.

The two also discussed Kosovo and the western Balkans, where the Secretary General said “there are many encouraging signs” and that “Kosovo is moving in the right direction”. “Euro-Atlantic integration for all countries in the Balkans must be the aim,” he added.

In speaking about NATO’s future, Mr Fogh Rasmussen said that territorial defence for member countries would remain a core function of the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept. “However, we also have to realize that in order to protect our people effectively, we need to adapt to the new security challenges of our century, like terrorism, cyber attacks [and] missile attacks.”

Prime Minister Orbán for his part said that Hungary is a very committed member of the Alliance and that the transatlantic cooperation NATO represents is a “cornerstone” of his country’s security.

On Afghanistan, he said the mission there has to conclude successfully to demonstrate NATO’s effectiveness as a leading organization in today’s world.

And in referring to NATO's future, the Prime Minister said: "Hungary would remain part of the common thinking on the future security and collective defence strategy of NATO."

Russia denounces U.S. missile move

2010-05-28T13:42:00.000+02:00

Russia has denounced the deployment of U.S. Patriot missiles in Poland as detrimental to regional security and trust.

“Such military activity does not help to strengthen our mutual security, to develop relations of trust and predictability in this region,” said the Foreign Ministry in a statement carried by the Itar-Tass news agency.

A battery of U.S. Patriot air defence missiles, to be manned by up to 150 U.S. troops, arrived on Sunday in Morag, a small town in north-eastern Poland just 60 km from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.

“We have stated more than once that we do not understand the logic and focus of cooperation between the U.S. and Poland in this sphere,” said the statement.

It is the first deployment of U.S. surface-to-air missiles so close to Russia's borders.

The missiles will be able to shoot down aircraft and missiles over the entire Kaliningrad region, according to Russia's NATO envoy Dmitry Rogozin.

Temporary deployment

Moscow said its questions to Washington and Warsaw had gone unanswered, as had its request to move the missile site farther from the Russian border. The Pentagon said the main purpose of the temporary deployment is to teach the Polish military to operate the advanced guided missile system.

However, in 2012 the Patriot base will become permanent.

Under President Barack Obama's reconfigured missile defence plan for Europe, Poland is also expected by 2018 to host SM-3 missile interceptors capable of shooting down Russian ballistic missiles.

NATO's Center of Gravity: Political Will

2010-05-27T12:11:00.000+02:00

Jorge Benitez: If NATO starts to lose the battle for the political will of its people, it will slowly fade into history. A major public diplomacy effort is needed to convince the democratic constituencies in NATO countries of the alliance’s salience. This is essential to the funding of military efforts in difficult economic times.

NATO must launch a major public diplomacy effort in order to reach out in a concerted effort to the Alliance’s members’ constituencies. More solidarity among NATO members is needed for the Alliance to muster the political will necessary to overcome the external and internal threats to its success in Afghanistan. The issue is crucial to the Alliance’s survival.

In a salient presentation at the Atlantic Council, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral James Stavridis, revealed a promising strategy for victory in Afghanistan. He stressed that the Afghan people are key to its resolution and need to be regarded as a center of gravity in the conflict. While the Admiral is absolutely correct, he still misses a decisive point; namely, that the people who constitute the NATO Alliance represent a center of gravity as well.

According to the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, a center of gravity is "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends" and "the point against which all our energies should be directed." While useful in offensive terms, Clausewitz failed to remind us to protect our own (defensive) center of gravity from the enemy's attack. Thus, although Admiral Stavridis correctly identified the offensive center of gravity in this conflict (depriving the al Qaeda/Taliban alliance of the support of the Afghan people), he ignored its defensive counterpart.

NATO urgently needs to protect its own center of gravity: the support of its people for the Alliance. If NATO loses the political will of the people in its member states, it will not be able to execute SACEUR's strategy and will never have the time to gain the lasting support of the Afghan people. The 2004 Madrid train bombings provide a striking example of how dangerous the lack of public support is to NATO’s mission. The bombings demonstrated that the enemy can influence public opinion and produce regime change, without ever needing to invade a NATO member country or occupying one of its national capitals.

Under the leadership of Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO has made an effort to build the political will within its member states through public diplomacy. The report by the Group of Experts highlighted the need for improvement in this area. "NATO populations should be reminded that the Alliance serves their interests through the security it provides." While such emphasis is a step forward, it is hardly sufficient. NATO needs to invest the same amount of energy and attention to reinforcing its defensive center of gravity (popular support for NATO in member countries) as it is dedicating to the offensive center of gravity (winning the support of the Afghan people).

For NATO to succeed, it is simply not enough to focus on educating leaders in national capitals. All of NATO's members are democracies, and thus it is crucial to invest time and effort into conveying NATO's message to the public at large. Until the Alliance does a better job of informing the general electorate of NATO’s value, it will unwittingly allow for the rise of leaders and governments that will choose parochial interests over the benefits of the transatlantic partnership.

Public diplomacy is not an option in an alliance of democracies, it is essential. Key alliance decisions are made, sanctioned, and funded by national legislatures that pay far more attention to public opinion than to strategy seminars. NATO needs to inform the public about the very real risks to each member's welfare and stress the Alliance's contributions to their protection and prosperity.

An uninformed public may tolerate providing the resources for a vaguely benign international organization and military force in good economic times. But in times of economic crisis, voters will not support political leaders who are perceived to be wasting scarce national resources on opaque efforts beyond the nation’s borders. Voters are even more averse to sacrificing the lives of their children in conflicts that appear distant and non-threatening.

Gen. David Petreus is beginning to win the conflict in Iraq because he understands that "the human terrain is the decisive terrain." If NATO starts to lose the battle for the political will of its people, it will slowly become a hollow alliance, comprised primarily of many bureaucrats and a few warriors. In time, it will follow the WEU into the dustbin of history. If we allow that to happen, we will unsuspectingly put ourselves in great peril.

Ukraine Is Not Yet 'Lost'

2010-05-21T14:45:00.001+02:00

Sacha Tessier-Stall and Kateryna Zarembo who are analysts at the International Center for Policy Studies in Kiev wrote to New York Times on the issue of Western-Russian-Ukraine triangle ...

Doom-sayers have been lamenting the West’s imminent “loss” of Ukraine for years, and the trend has only picked up since Viktor Yanukovich was elected president in February. In the recent signing of an agreement prolonging the lease of a Russian naval base in Crimea, they see proof of the new president’s desire to cement his country’s status as a Russian satellite.

They’re wrong. Sort of.

True, it’s a bad deal. In exchange for rebates on natural gas until 2019, President Yanukovich has allowed Moscow to station its Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sevastopol until 2042. In doing so, he has allowed Russia to maintain a foothold in a particularly unstable part of Ukraine — Crimea — and to continue to project its military power in the volatile Black Sea region — not a minor development, especially after Russia and neighbor Georgia came to blows in August 2008.

Just as worrying, the rebates will allow the president to postpone reform of Ukraine’s famously corrupt and inefficient energy sector. They are life support for a fossilized system that should long have gone the way of the dinosaurs.

Putting off reform is politically profitable for Mr. Yanukovich, who depends on the support of industrial and energy barons who made their fortunes thanks to corruption and artificially cheap gas. But it comes at a high political cost to Ukraine, which now essentially depends on Russian subsidies to pay for the energy it consumes.

In other words, the deal bolsters Russia’s influence in Ukraine and its claim to a sphere of influence in the region.

But those who see it as evidence of Mr. Yanukovich’s determination to steer his country back into Russia’s orbit are not looking at the right things.

The agreement is less evidence of Mr. Yanukovich’s geopolitical inclinations than proof of his country’s weakness. Ukraine’s economy shrank by one seventh in 2009, and with it the government’s ability to pay its energy bills.

Even Yulia Tymoshenko, a leader of the Orange Revolution who as recently as 2008 had called for Ukraine to join NATO, as prime minister found herself compelled in 2009 to make important concessions to Moscow — including a gas accord so one-sided it had to be revised only a few months after its signing.

Nor, for all its repercussions, does the deal spell the end of European integration in the broader sense. While NATO membership is clearly off the table in the short and probably medium terms, that was evident already before Mr. Yanukovich came to power.

The new president has resisted attempts by Moscow to get Ukraine to join a Russia-led customs union, preferring instead to continue negotiations on a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union.

He has described European integration as his “key priority,” symbolically making his first visit as president to Brussels — much to Moscow’s ire. Mr. Yanukovich is less Western-oriented than his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko, but he is not a Kremlin stooge.

Despite his reputation for incompetence, Yanukovich can be a smooth operator. The gas agreement may undermine Ukraine’s position vis-à-vis Russia, but it is popular with industry and many households, whom it saves from higher gas bills (for this year at least).

It also paves the way for a national budget acceptable to the I.M.F., whose deficit-reduction demands have been a major stumbling block in negotiations on the release of further tranches of its emergency loan. Even U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called it evidence of Ukraine’s new “balanced approach” to foreign policy.

More worrying than the agreement’s content is the deeply flawed way in which it was concluded — and what this says about Mr. Yanukovich’s attitude toward the rule of law in Ukraine.

The Constitution prohibits the basing of foreign military installations on Ukrainian territory, albeit in unclear terms. What’s more, the deal was never submitted to Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, as it should have been, and the normal parliamentary ratification procedure was not respected. This, combined with the constitutionally dubious way in which Mr. Yanukovich recently pieced together his parliamentary majority, raises serious questions about his willingness to play by the rules.

It is too early to say that President Yanukovich is intentionally helping Russia “steal” Ukraine from the West. He is more positively inclined toward Moscow than his predecessor, but the truth is that he has been pushed into a corner by a combination of geopolitical ineptness, special interests and pre-existing problems.

The real question is whether he takes his obligations (constitutional and otherwise) seriously. If he doesn’t, both the West and Russia are in for unpleasant surprises.

Did Kim Jong Il order the torpedo strike?

2010-05-20T20:20:00.000+02:00

Which interpretation of the (not-so-shocking) news that North Korea sank a South Korean warship is more troubling: that Kim Jong Il ordered the torpedo strike, or that he didn't?

Ruediger Frank, a North Korea expert at the University of Vienna, says it's the latter:

The “cornered tiger” scenario is the only condition, beyond mental illness, under which Kim Jong Il would choose this option. One possible interpretation of the sinking of the Cheonan is that the situation in North Korea is so bad and the regime so desperate that it believes risking annihilation is its only option. But while it is hard to regard the situation in North Korea as rosy, it has been through worse times. With the currency reforms of 2009, the regime was able to win some time in its otherwise hopeless fight against the inevitable transformation of North Korea’s society when it expropriated the growing wealth from the newly emerging middle class and tried to partially demonetize the economy again. And as far as we know, prior to March 26, there was no intelligence pointing to unusual troop movements; no increase in communications that might have signaled something out of the ordinary was about to happen or signs that a change in the military’s alert status was about to take place.

Of all the possible scenarios for why North Korea would have been involved in the Cheonan incident, the one that should worry us the most is the possibility that it was NOT Kim Jong Il who gave the orders. While in 2008 one could have imagined, under certain circumstances, that a young recruit overreacted and shot a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang, it is much less likely that the captain of a North Korean submarine had a short fuse and sank that corvette. He must have done so upon receiving orders, or at least a “go ahead” from someone above him. The higher up we move in the command chain, the stress motive becomes less likely. A lieutenant commander in his sub might think twice; a rear admiral will think ten times before pulling the trigger.

If the North Koreans torpedoed the ship, and if it was not done after a self-destructive order by Kim Jong Il, this may be proof of a destabilization of the current leadership in Pyongyang. Sinking the Cheonan without consent by the top leader would be an open act of insubordination. An autocratic leader who does not have his lieutenants under control becomes a liability to the system. It is fear and the unchallenged authority of the top that keeps an autocracy together. Many of us have argued that such considerations had allowed Kim Jong Il to take over power from his father so smoothly despite his very different personality: the elite knew that regime stability depended on a strong and undisputed leader, and he was the only realistic candidate for the job.

Yet, years have passed since 1994, and North Korea has changed substantially. A famine, a set of failed economic policies, and Kim’s obvious health issues have created a situation of frustration, insecurity, and nervousness. The Pyongyang elite will be holding their breath and watching closely how Kim Jong Il reacts. What if he does not succeed in creating the impression that sinking the Cheonan was his idea? Even if so, this is a catch-22 since it invites a potentially destructive counter reaction by South Korea and the United States. If it wasn’t done on his command, will Kim Jong Il conduct a major purge of the culprits like his father did in 1956, when a trip to Europe was used to launch a coup against him? If he doesn’t, then the vultures will get more courageous.

Frank worries most of all about a rapid and messy regime collapse, leading to "a humanitarian disaster, a last-ditch effort at a military solution, or the active involvement of superpowers like China."

There are clearly a lot of folks in the region who are also worried about this scenario. But it's worth noting that North Korea already is a humanitarian disaster. At some point, Kim Jong Il's regime is going to have to end before that situation changes. I don't see any signs that outside players, save perhaps China, have any hope of micromanaging some sort of smooth transition to a more decent government.

Advanced Research Workshop - "Perceptions of NATO: a balance 60 years after" (17 e 18 de Maio)

2010-05-16T17:13:00.001+02:00

“Perceptions of NATO: a balance 60 years after”, directed by Luís Nuno Rodrigues (ISCTE-IUL e IPRI) and Volodymyr Dubovyk (Odessa N. University). This Advanced Research Workshop will provide an assessment of how NATO and its mission are perceived today in the world. This topic is particularly relevant when the Organization just completed 60 years of existence and is in a process of redifining its strategic concept. The ARW will evaluate how NATO is seen and perceived both in member countries and in countries that do not belong to the Organization. Special attention will be given to the younger generations, raised after the Cold War, and to the way they see NATO’s role, mission and utility in the 21st Century. (also here)

SIMOTAN V - Official Journal

2010-05-15T19:41:00.004+02:00

For those who would like to take a glimpse at how SIMOTAN V developed from 5 to 8 May, please take a look at the Official Journal published here and here.

Ten Recommendations for David Cameron’s Administration

2010-05-13T21:21:00.001+02:00

After 13 years of Labour government, Britain’s relationship with the European Union (EU) needs to be recalibrated. Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown presided over massive transfers of Britain’s sovereignty to the EU while denying the British people a referendum on important constitutional changes such as the Lisbon Treaty. The new British foreign secretary, William Hague, has stated that he will implement a “distinctively British foreign policy.”[1] The following 10 recommendations will allow Hague to fashion a more transatlantic-orientated approach to his government’s European policies:

1. Do Not Join the Euro

For EU elites determined to create a European superstate, a single European currency is the ultimate prize. However, the current economic crisis in Greece demonstrates the shortcomings of creating a political union without a sound economic foundation. Britain should not underwrite failing European economies, let alone provide the European Central Bank and the European Commission the power to set Britain’s interest rates and other economic policies by embracing the Euro.

2. Introduce a U.K. Sovereignty Bill and a Referendum Lock

At the last general election, all three major political parties promised the British people a referendum on the EU’s proposed constitution. In addition to providing such a “referendum lock,” a U.K. sovereignty bill would further affirm the authority of Parliament over the EU. In order to restore public trust in manifesto commitments, the sovereignty bill and referendum lock should be introduced in the first year of the new government.

3. Bring Back Britain’s Rebate

In 2005, Blair agreed to give up a portion of Britain’s rebate from the EU’s budget in exchange for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Through November 2009, this decision cost Britain €10.5 billion ($13.3 billion), and there has been no meaningful reform of the CAP.[2] French President Nicolas Sarkozy—whose country receives the largest portion of CAP payments—even shut Britain out of talks on the future of EU agricultural subsidies.[3] Prime Minister Cameron and Foreign Secretary Hague should follow in the footsteps of then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who first secured the British rebate in 1984, and restore Britain’s rebate.

4. Repatriate Policy Competences from the EU

It is estimated that EU social laws will cost Britain £71 billion ($105 billion) over the next 10 years.[4] Legislation such as the Working Time Directive has been damaging to Britain’s economy and will prove especially harmful as the government seeks to regain economic competiveness in the years ahead. The British government should therefore advance proposals to repatriate key policy areas from the EU’s regulatory juggernaut and subject any further provisions to their “referendum lock.”

5. Oppose a Unilateral Move to Raise EU Emissions Reduction Targets to 30 Percent

The EU pledged to increase its emissions reduction targets to 30 percent if an international agreement could be reached at Copenhagen in December 2009. Although the international climate change negotiations collapsed, the EU is now proposing to unilaterally pursue the 30 percent target at a cost of €81billion ($103 billion).[5]

6. Abolish the EU’s Parliamentary Sessions in Strasbourg

For one week per month, the European Parliament transfers its entire staff from Brussels to Strasbourg, where it holds monthly voting sessions. This travelling circus costs the European taxpayers around €200 million per year ($300 million) and wastes valuable time that could be better spent critically scrutinising EU legislation.

7. Maintain the Primacy of NATO in Europe’s Defense Architecture

NATO guarantees Britain’s security as well as that of its European and North American allies. Importantly, it ensures that Europe and America are able to collectively defend themselves in the event of an attack. It is critical, therefore, that NATO is not undermined by duplicate defense arrangements such as the European Security and Defense Policy, which will draw away critical resources and undercut NATO’s political solidarity.

8. Press Britain’s NATO Allies to More Fairly Share the Burden in Afghanistan

Britain and America are among a handful of nations disproportionately shouldering the burden of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. It is vital that Britain’s NATO partners step up to the plate by providing additional combat troops, equipment, and political support for the new counterinsurgency strategy to which it agreed last year. Britain should also press its European allies to spend NATO’s benchmark of 2 percent of their GDP on their national defense.

9. Put Defense at the Heart of National Security

The Liberal Democrats support the prioritization of climate change in Britain’s national security strategy. The next government should not redirect already scarce funds from security and defense priorities toward costly and unnecessary climate change measures. Britain’s national security strategy should focus on the clear and present dangers to the security of the U.K. and its allies including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.

10. Press the EU to Implement Targeted, Crippling Sanctions Against Iran

The United Nations has imposed three rounds of sanctions against Iran in an effort to convince Tehran to give up its illicit nuclear weapons program; it is highly unlikely that a fourth round of sanctions will change Tehran’s mind. The EU should therefore impose targeted and crippling sanctions on Iran—on top of the U.N. sanctions. Britain should lead Europe in imposing sanctions on energy imports, domestic oil refinery capacity, and international banking. Sanctions should also be brought against the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and companies affiliated with it.

Rediscovering Thatcher

In 1988, Margaret Thatcher laid out an Atlanticist vision for the future of Europe as an alternative to the relentless integration and centralization pursued by EU elites. The British government should revive this model and advance a strong transatlantic alliance, with the Anglo–American Special Relationship at its center.

Georgia's NATO Dream

2010-05-06T19:23:00.001+02:00

If there was ever any doubt that of the NATO membership process being a political exercise, one needn’t look further than the Alliance’s decision to grant tiny, fractured Bosnia-Herzgovinia a Membership Action Plan on April 22 during the NATO gathering in Tallinn.

According to EUObserver, NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen marked Bosnia’s accession to the traditional integration pathway with caveats over the country’s readiness, underlining the divisions within the Alliance over the MAP.

“Last night Nato foreign ministers made an important decision to invite Bosnia and Herzegovina to join Membership Action Plan, but made clear that there are still important reform issues that need to be solved,” said Rasmussen (1). However, another NATO statement glossed over uncertainties.

“Bosnia and Herzegovina has made significant progress on reform,” said the NATO statement. “NATO foreign ministers welcome its decision on destruction of surplus ammunition and arms and its new ISAF contributions [soldiers in Afghanistan].”

Alliance disagreements notwithstanding, it’s now become only a matter of time before Bosnia joins the 27-member security pact, as no country to be awarded a MAP has ever been denied eventual entry. Naturally, however, the Tallinn decision also begs a question over NATO’s political priorities. Bosnia, for whatever its merits, can hardly be considered a more adequate candidate for NATO than Georgia, whose own ISAF contributions significantly outweigh that of Bosnia’s. Currently, nearly 1000 Georgian troops are engaged in both reconstruction and peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan with no national caveats. Bosnia has ten.

On broader measures, Georgia also does better. Though Bosnia and Georgia rank similarly according to Freedom House’s 2009 Freedom in the World index, at 4:3 and 4:4, respectively (lower is better), Georgia is far ahead according to the Heritage Institute’s 2010 Index of Economic Freedom (26th place to Bosnia’s 110th) and Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index (66th to Bosnia’s 99th) (2).

By any objective measure – both military and socio-economic – Georgia should have gotten a MAP long before Bosnia, which is arguably faces an equally, if not greater, challenging set of political circumstances borne from violence in the 1990s. Bosnia’s greatest advantage over Georgia, however, seems to be the comparative lack of patronage by Moscow to its own separatists. Though Russia has expressed support for the Serbian enclave in Bosnia, its geographic distance and relative obscurity on the Kremlin’s foreign policy agenda (compared to Georgia or even Serbia and Kosova) make Russia’s political investment in Bosnia a far lesser challenge to its application for a MAP. This is similarly true for Macedonia, which would have already achieved NATO membership were it not for a Greek veto over its name, or Albania, which has already joined the Alliance.

Though NATO representatives have in denied Russia’s influence in Georgia’s membership bid in the past, these counter-examples of NATO alignment by states showing, in many cases, even less progress than Georgia makes these denials dubious. Accordingly, it is long past time for NATO to acknowledge this reality for what it is rather than obscuring its true rationale with rhetoric about reform.

Still, among most foreign policy analysts, it’s no great secret that Georgia’s stalled proposal for NATO membership is being held captive by Moscow and, by proxy, the interests they command in Europe. Obviously, Georgia cannot accede to the Atlantic Alliance under the same standards as other countries.

Instead, Georgia’s unique position requires a different set of solutions. First, Georgia must continue to pursue meaningful reforms aggressively and consistently. Although there are many elements in Georgia’s political class – both in government and the opposition – that would prefer to slow, stop, or even reverse the trend in reforms, the chance for NATO accession will heavily rely on the quality and reach of Georgia’s reform process. In the 1990s, similar doubts clouded the case for the Baltic states’ applications to NATO, but the speed and thoroughness of reforms left no doubt of those countries’ readiness, and deservedness, for NATO membership. In other words, Georgia must be far and away better on every metric to earn realistic consideration, let alone join. This must go beyond the preachy pronouncements regularly aired by Georgian politicians about successful reforms, but rather should be reflected in such things as economic growth, peaceful and democratic transfers of power, a viable loyal opposition, and a truly free media.

Also, Georgia’s precarious defense situation vis-à-vis Russia simply must be resolved. Without a doubt, under present and foreseeable conditions, there is no appetite in NATO to accept a member that is constantly harassed by the specter of war with Russia. In some ways, this is something of a chicken-and-egg situation. Many Georgian policymakers regard NATO as the single best way to deter Russian aggression, yet NATO is unlikely to invite Georgia to the Alliance if it is perceived as a simmering crisis waiting to happen. This is not a conundrum that can be solved merely through good trade relations or even inordinate contributions to international peacekeeping efforts, but will require devising a strategy that will either persuade or compel Moscow to treat Tbilisi with greater respect for its territorial integrity and, more importantly, its foreign policy orientation.

In some quarters, this has translated into pushing for concessions to Moscow or even mortgaging Georgian sovereignty for greater leniency from the Kremlin. Putting aside the fact that such a policy would obviously negate NATO membership and defeat the purpose of Georgia’s quest for inclusion into the Alliance, NATO itself is unlikely to be in any hurry to invite states that it sees as Russian proxies. More to the point, a Moscow-aligned Georgia is not likely to fulfill the reform and governance requirements of NATO for accession. Clearly, this is a non-option.

Alternately, a more plausible option for Georgia would be to create conditions in which Russia has no choice but to withdraw its aggressive posture towards Georgia. As this is unlikely to be fulfilled by mere acts of diplomacy – even recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent would not satisfy Russian foreign policy goals – Georgia should instead look to make the proposition of another invasion one of unacceptably high risk to Russia.

Currently, Georgia’s military is oriented towards interoperability with NATO operations and command structures – probably in an effort to ‘prove’ its worth as a NATO partner. Though laudable, on its own it will almost assuredly not result in NATO membership. Instead, Georgia’s military should be developed expressly and explicitly for the task of territorial defense.

Creating this ability in the Georgian armed forces would be no minor task, as it involves not just a quantitative increase in the size of its military, but also in procuring defense systems and acquiring new capabilities. Perhaps more than anything, Georgia may want to reconsider its current focus on its ground forces, which alone will never be able to resist a full Russian invasion. Rather, the Georgian armed forces should consider investing in its long-neglected and near-invisible air forces, which can more quickly respond to defense contingencies and act as force multipliers for ground and naval forces. Conceivably, a couple of squadrons of multirole fighters could police Georgian airspace and allow for ground attack units like its existing SU-25s and attack helicopters to support ground operations. Perhaps more importantly, the deterrent role of an advanced air force could prevent such a situation from ever happening in the first place.

Of course, there are obstacles to acquiring this capability as well. Besides the steep costs normally associated with procuring and maintaining advanced fighters, the de facto arms embargo that is currently in force against Georgia makes acquiring such equipment doubly hard. However, the case for selling Georgia defensive equipment is a comparatively much simpler task than banking on a sudden change of heart by NATO, and particularly more-so given France’s apparent willingness to sell Russia a wish list of arms (3). Though hardly a foregone conclusion, there are enough potential sellers of multirole jet aircraft – both new and secondhand – to leverage a purchase of the equipment Georgia needs to defend itself.

Georgia faces an altogether different set of expectations from other countries in its NATO application process that cannot be resolved by deft diplomacy or good reforms alone. For Georgia to truly make headway towards Euro-Atlantic integration, it must make the cost of another Russian invasion unacceptably high for Moscow. Though Tbilisi would never win in an arms race with Russia, it can at least develop its defenses to a point where Moscow’s threshold for a military option is appreciably raised. A more secure geostrategic position coupled with strong reform progress is the only way for Georgia to ever have a chance of joining NATO and forever freeing itself from the long arm of Moscow.

SIMOTAN V

2010-05-06T17:03:00.002+02:00

Merkel defends Germany's Afghanistan mandate

2010-04-23T20:29:00.000+02:00

According to , Chancellor Angela Merkel defended Germany's military presence in Afghanistan on Thursday - rejecting opposition claims that the country was now involved in a level of warfare that parliament had not agreed to.

Merkel's address to parliament followed the recent deaths of seven German soldiers in two insurgent attacks in northern Afghanistan, prompting renewed soul-searching in a country where the military mission is already deeply unpopular.

'This mandate is valid, over and above any sensible doubt under international or constitutional law,' Merkel said in an address to the Bundestag, or parliament.

The chancellor said she understood those who referred to the conflict as 'war' but added that the parliament had been fully aware of conditions in Afghanistan when they agreed to extend the military mandate earlier this year.

'We can't expect bravery from our soldiers, if we lack the courage to stand up for what we agreed to,' the chancellor added.

Merkel and Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, both of the ruling Christian Democrats (CDU), have raised legal questions in recent months by acknowledging that the armed conflict in Afghanistan could be described as 'war' in common parlance.

As a result, opposition leader Sigmar Gabriel of the Social Democrats (SDP) has questioned the validity of the current mandate, which authorizes the German military to take part in 'armed conflict' in the region.

The government would legally have to seek renewed parliamentary approval for a mandate to wage war in Afghanistan.

War is legally defined as a conflict between states, which does not aptly describe the conflict that Germany is engaged in under the NATO umbrella.

Tipping point in Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo: EU and NATO must finish the job

2010-04-22T19:48:00.001+02:00

Despite progress, trouble looms in Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo. Better engagement now by NATO and the EU can prevent backsliding.

Remember Bosnia? Kosovo? In the 1990s, we learned a new phrase – ethnic cleansing – and we embarked on the first of what have now been many interventions in regional crises. Yet 15 years after the Serbian massacre of more than 7,000 Muslims at Srebrenica, we have still not finished the job of making the Balkans peaceful and safe for all.

This was the subject of a recent hearing held by Sens. Jeanne Shaheen, Jim DeMint, and George Voinovich in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It’s also a subject likely to be discussed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at this week’s NATO meeting in Estonia.

To be sure, the region has seen some success. Slovenia and Croatia are vibrant democracies, increasingly prosperous, and members of NATO. Slovenia is also a member of the European Union, and Croatia is well on its way. Albania is a member of NATO. And Montenegro is making rapid progress.

But trouble looms. With nationalists pulling at the fabric of Bosnia, with Serbia and a handful of EU members refusing to recognize an independent Kosovo, with Serbia still not having found its place in the European family, with NATO and the EU fatigued on further enlargement, with crime and corruption rampant, the region risks sliding back into instability and worse.

This can be prevented – at far lower cost than it took to stop ethnic cleansing in the 1990s, or what it would cost to intervene again. Compared with Afghanistan, we have advantages in the Balkans: no active fighting; a literate population and skilled workforce; an advanced economy; and a surrounding region made up of EU and NATO members.

What’s more, we know what is needed for success: using the attractive power of NATO and the EU to drive through tough but needed reforms.

The challenge in the Balkans is the same challenge Europe has faced for centuries – overcoming history. It is no easy task. It takes strong incentives and disincentives for nations to let go of irredentism, the memories of territories lost, and the grievances of past warfare, and instead to invest in the future.

But as we saw in the 1990s, the real, near-term prospect of NATO and EU membership provides just that kind of incentive structure. It strengthens the hand of reformers in convincing publics that short-term pain and rejecting nationalist agendas will deliver greater benefits, and that the contrast – wallowing in these agendas – will separate a nation from a growing, integrated European family.

Clearly, countries must meet the conditions of membership. They must do the hard work of reform. But the EU and NATO can be passive or active. A passive stance gives little incentive and empowers those with revanchist agendas. But an activist stance, where we stress our willingness to admit new members and work with candidate countries on specific reforms, empowers those who are prepared to implement the fastest and farthest reaching change.

Now is a time to give new energy to finishing the job in the Balkans – to bringing that region fully into the European mainstream before it slides backward. Several steps can be taken:

First, the EU and NATO must reiterate, emphatically and credibly, that they are prepared to admit as members every country in the Balkans that meets the conditions of membership.

Second, to generate this renewed political commitment, Washington will need to engage actively not only with the EU and NATO as institutions, but also with key member states.

Third, the EU and NATO should aggressively use the tools already at their disposal to incentivize necessary reforms – for example, visa-free travel, EU association agreements, and NATO’s Membership Action Plan.

Fourth, in Bosnia, we should maintain a robust international presence and commitment, including a strong, international “high representative” and an EU force, until Bosnia sustainably implements far-reaching reform.

Fifth, we should maintain a robust commitment in Kosovo – both through the nearly 10,000 soldiers that make up the NATO-led Kosovo Force and through the European Union Rule of Law Mission – while pushing for recognition by all EU states and improved governance within (and throughout all) of Kosovo.

Sixth, we need to give a renewed impetus to resolving the Macedonia name issue. Because Greece’s own identity is linked to ancient Macedonia, it strongly objects to its northern neighbor going by the name “Republic of Macedonia.” The Macedonians could begin with modest confidence-building measures – Does the airport really have to be named after Alexander the Great? – followed by compromises by both sides.

Seventh, NATO and the EU should reward Montenegro’s reform successes by accelerating its path toward membership in both institutions – not least because this can spur greater momentum in the region.

Eighth, the US and EU should carry out a robust bilateral engagement with Serbia, building its sense of belonging within the transatlantic community.

And ninth, we should work aggressively with Albania to strengthen democratic institutions, transparency, and anticorruption, in part by leveraging the prospect of EU membership.

Resolving these lingering issues is difficult, but doable. And far better to invest the energy and effort now, when the region is calm, than to risk greater instability in the future. Remember: The worst human-rights atrocities in Europe since the Holocaust happened in the Balkans just 15 years ago.

Vacancies left for DAYS 2010

2010-04-20T09:36:00.002+02:00

Dear YATA-members,

Deadline for application for our annual youth seminar DAYS is now expired. However, we still have some vacancies left and we encourage all interested to apply for participation as soon as possible.

DAYS 2010 is the 25th anniversary of the event gathering young people from different countries to discuss and engage in foreign and security politics. The program is almost finished and we look forward to introducing you to a very inspiring and exiting seminar.

For more information you can have a look at our website: www.atlant.dk/days.html
Where you will also find the invitation and application form for DAYS 2010.

Application, motivation letter or questions can be sent to emma@atlant.dk

Best regards,
Emma Hjernø
Project Coordinator DAYS 2010

Quick piece on Prague dinner America and eastern Europe Guess who's coming to dinner?

2010-04-08T22:55:00.000+02:00

Barack Obama tries to fix damaged relations with eastern European allies

THE Obama administration’s closest European allies are oddly tricky to please. An invitation to the leaders of the 11 ex-communist members of NATO to dine with the president in Prague on April 8th was meant to repair a relationship both cherished and moaned about. Instead, indigestion was looming even before the meal was cooked.

It should have gone smoothly. The president is in Prague to sign a new nuclear disarmament agreement with Russia. Even the twitchiest ex-communist countries don’t mind that. The choice of Prague, the capital of a key American ally in the region, over a neutral location such as Geneva, was meant to signal America’s continued commitment to the region’s security. Mr Obama could have simply headed home after the ceremony, or travelled on to a meeting with one big ally. Instead, he chose to invite, admittedly at short notice, all of his ex-communist allies to talk.

The first sign of trouble was that the guest list looked odd. From the three Baltic states, the administration invited the presidents (Toomas Hendrik Ilves of Estonia, Valdis Zatlers of Latvia and Dalia Grybauskaite of Lithuania). But from most of the other eight countries, it was the prime ministers. Admittedly, lines of responsibility between heads of state and government can be blurred. But the rationale for including the mainly ceremonial Baltic presidents but snubbing the Polish president, Lech Kaczynski, who has rather more clout, was mystifying.

While heads were being scratched, Ms Grybauskaite dropped a small bomb. She would not be going to Prague, she said. Her prime minister, Andrius Kubilius, would stand in for her. Explaining her decision, Ms Grybauskaite complained that the dinner would involve “no decision-making”, that it was organised by junior officials, that its outcome was unclear and that she would have only two minutes to talk one-on-one with Mr Obama. Coming from a country roughly one-hundredth America’s size, that showed a startling self-confidence, even by Lithuanian standards.

Next came a remark by a “senior US official” in the New York Times, that the president “will seek to impress upon regional leaders a new attitude toward Russia in which the outmoded fears of Russians hiding under the bed are a thing of the past”. That appeared to confirm the east Europeans’ darkest fears about America’s new cosiness with Russia. Senior officials dealing with the region in the White House and the State Department categorically denied that any such thinking lay behind the dinner.

Clumsiness in American presentation of policy in the region is nothing new. Some Poles are still fuming about the botched announcement of a change in American missile defence plans on September 17th last year. That date, the anniversary of the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland, matters there roughly as much as Pearl Harbour day does in America. The blunder followed a fretful public protest from leading figures in the region, such as Vaclav Havel, about weakening transatlantic ties.

But since then the administration has worked hard to improve things. It has pushed through NATO contingency plans for the Baltic states, the alliance’s most vulnerable members, bringing a spectacular German flip-flop on this previously taboo issue. The new missile defence scheme is bigger and better than the one it ditched. And now the president, on yet another visit to Europe, has invited everyone to dinner.

The lingering difficulties reflect the real problem in the US relationship with central Europe, which is in the ingredients, not the cooking. The days of instinctive Atlanticism in the region are over, as Ms Grybauskaite’s haughty stance, which would once have been inconceivable, demonstrates. The ex-communist allies’ contribution to solving most of America’s problems is marginal, at best. Europe itself is divided and lacks credibility in the eyes of busy Americans. Sorting that out needs hard thinking and a long slog, not just a nice dinner

30 days through Afghanistan

2010-03-30T21:20:00.004+02:00

Tech SGT. Ken Raimondi and Tech SGT. Nathan Gallahan, military journalists of ISAF's Joint Command in Kabul have been travelling around Afghanistan in one month for a web-based project titled "30 Days Through Afghanistan".

“There are so many people in this country who have so much to say, and there’s so much to talk about, that I could have spent 10 years blogging every day and could have found something new to talk about” Gallahan said.

Ken Raimondi added that while “30 Days Through Afghanistan” may have broken new ground in contemporary military journalism, it really represents a return to the personal, frontline interview style of famed World War II reporter Ernie Pyle.

From my point of view, this project represent a unique opportunity to learn first hand (or almost...) about the so many positive stories Afghan people are experimenting. Watching some of the vlogs, it is clear how much efforts the international community is putting in reconstruction efforts for Afghanistan. “There was no approval chain. What we saw, we talked about,” Raimondi said. That is - I think - the major achievement of "30 days through Afghanistan"!

Both reporters said they were gratified to read comments submitted by some of the several thousand followers of the blog, which Gallahan wrote, and the video log postings, which Raimondi produced. Although they would have liked the Web site to have attracted a larger audience beyond the military community, they said, they hope their approach has opened doors for others. I hope YATA Community will contribute in spreading the word.

Russia and U.S. Report Breakthrough on Arms

2010-03-28T14:11:00.002+02:00

The United States and Russia have broken a logjam in arms control negotiations and expect to sign a treaty next month to slash their nuclear arsenals to the lowest levels in half a century, officials in both nations said Wednesday.

After months of deadlock and delay, the two sides have agreed to lower the limit on deployed strategic warheads by more than one-quarter and launchers by half, the officials said. The treaty will impose a new inspection regime to replace one that lapsed in December, but will not restrict American plans for missile defense based in Europe.

President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia plan to talk Friday to complete the agreement, but officials said they were optimistic that the deal was nearly done. The two sides have begun preparing for a signing ceremony in Prague on April 8, timing it to mark the anniversary of Mr. Obama’s speech in the Czech capital outlining his vision for eventually ridding the world of nuclear weapons.

The new treaty represents perhaps the most concrete foreign policy achievement for Mr. Obama since he took office 14 months ago and the most significant result of his effort to “reset” the troubled relationship with Russia. The administration wants to use it to build momentum for an international nuclear summit meeting in Washington just days after the signing ceremony and a more ambitious round of arms cuts later in his term.

“This gives a boost” to the administration’s efforts to build better ties to Russia, said Steven Pifer, a top State Department official under President George W. Bush who specialized in Russia and arms control issues. “There’s still a ways to go and there are still difficult issues. But the last six months, it seems to be going pretty well and this adds to the positive in the relationship.”

More broadly, the White House hopes the treaty will build on the president’s victory in the fight to overhaul health care, demonstrating progress on both the international and domestic fronts after months of frustration over unmet goals.

The new 10-year pact would replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991, or Start, which expired in December, and further extend cuts negotiated in 2002 by Mr. Bush in the Treaty of Moscow. Under the new pact, according to people briefed on it in Washington and Moscow, within seven years each side would have to cut its deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 from the 2,200 now allowed. Each side would cut the total number of launchers to 800 from 1,600 now permitted. The number of nuclear-armed missiles and heavy bombers would be capped at 700 each.

Neither the White House nor the Kremlin formally announced the agreement on Wednesday, pending the final telephone call between the presidents. A Kremlin official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said there was an agreement on the text of the pact, although not all the wording had been given final approval. Robert Gibbs, the White House press secretary, said, “We’re very close.”

Arms control proponents hailed the progress. Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, called it “the first truly post-cold-war nuclear arms reduction treaty.” Richard Burt, a former chief Start negotiator who now heads a disarmament advocacy group called Global Zero, said that the two presidents “took a major step toward achieving their goal of global zero.”

The breakthrough ended nearly a year of tumultuous negotiations that dragged on far longer than anticipated. The two sides quarreled over verifying compliance, sharing telemetry and limiting missile defense programs. Mr. Obama restructured Mr. Bush’s plans for an antimissile shield in Europe, but Moscow objected to the new version as well and wanted restrictions. Mr. Obama refused. The two presidents cut through disagreements during a telephone call on March 13.

The treaty will go for ratification to the legislatures in both countries, and the politics of Senate ratification could be tricky, coming at a polarized moment with a midterm election on the horizon. Republican senators have already expressed concern that Mr. Obama might make unacceptable concessions. Ratification in the Senate requires 67 votes, meaning Mr. Obama would need support from Republicans.

Senators Mitch McConnel of Kentucky and Jon Kyl of Arizona, the Republican leaders, wrote Mr. Obama last week warning him that ratification “is highly unlikely” if the treaty contained any binding linkage between offensive weapons and missile defense, reminding him of his position “that missile defense is simply not on the table.”

Administration officials describing the draft treaty said its preamble recognized the relationship between offensive weapons and missile defense, but that the language was not binding. The treaty establishes a new regime of inspections, but the American monitoring team that was based at the Votkinsk missile production factory until Start expired would not be allowed to return on a permanent basis.

Russian analysts said Moscow was happy to have reduced what it saw as the overly intrusive inspection regime mandated by Start but disappointed not to have secured restrictions on missile defense. The military was pressuring the Kremlin not to agree to arms reductions without limits on the American missile shield, even though both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama have described it as aimed at Iran, not Russia. In the end, the Kremlin overruled the military because it wanted a foreign policy achievement. “The military does not have the influence that it did during Soviet times,” said Anton V. Khlopkov, director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies in Moscow. “Back then, the military people, if they didn’t run, they were among those who led the arms control negotiations from the Soviet side. Now, they have less of a role.”

Vladimir Z. Dvorkin, a retired major general and arms control adviser, said Moscow would retain the ability to scrap the new treaty if American missile defenses became a threat. “If, for example, the U.S. unilaterally deploys considerable amounts of missile defense, then Russia has the right to withdraw from the agreement because the spirit of the preamble has been violated,” he said.

Mr. Obama met at the White House on Wednesday with Senators John Kerry of Massachusetts and Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, the senior Democrat and Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to brief them on the negotiations. Mr. Kerry later said he would hold hearings between Easter and Memorial Day on the history of arms control and promised action by year’s end. “I assured the president that we strongly support his efforts and that if the final negotiations and all that follows go smoothly, we will work to ensure that the Senate can act on the treaty this year,” Mr. Kerry said.

NATO History: 1990 No pledges not to expand NATO eastward

2010-03-27T18:36:00.004+01:00

In early nineties, when Est-West confrontation was ending, USSR leader Gorbaciev was promised by European and North American leaders that NATO will not be expanded eastward, if he would accept reunification of Germany.

Mark Kramer, Cold War Studies Project at Harvard University and a senior fellow of Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, in his recent analysis on the Washington Quarterly, challenges this thesis and argues that no ‘pledge’ or ‘commitment’ or ‘categorical assurances’ about NATO’s role vis-a`-vis the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries were made during the negotiations between Europeans, Americans and Russians leading toward Germany reunification, as previously assumed.

Kramer assumption is that in 1990 it was too early to talk about these issues, since NATO expansion was not in anyone's agenda, excluding East Germany. Following the declassification of written memories and other crucial documents of the actual conversations, the surviving assumption of "no-eastward-enlargement-pledge"can be challenged. The protagonists of that time [Kohl (then German Chancellor), Gorbaciev, Shevardnadze (then USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Baker (then US Secretary of State)] have not clearly discussed that option.

New START Treaty agreement

2010-03-27T18:04:00.002+01:00

On March 26th, US President Obama and Russian President Medvedev declared that an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons and their means of delivery has been reached by the two countries.

The agreement will be signed in Prague, Czech Republic on April 8th. According to President Obama "the United States and Russia have agreed to the most comprehensive arms control agreement in nearly two decades" while President Medvedev said that "the negotiators’ constructive mindset made it possible to achieve a tremendous result in a short time".

Intenational Conference Afghanistan and beyond : NATO heading towards a new strategic concept

2010-03-24T17:04:00.003+01:00

On March 10th and 11th, the conference “Afghanistan and beyond : NATO heading towards a new Strategic Concept “ was held in the Cripta Aula Magna of Università Cattolica in Milan. The meeting was supported by the Centre of High Studies for Defence, by NATO Public Diplomacy Division, by the Army Comand of Lombardy and by NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (Italy). It was organized by the Department of Political Sciences of Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore and directed by Professor Massimo de Leonardis.
The Conference saw the participation of more than 200 students, young professionals and experts.

On the first day, major exponents of the diplomatic, military and academic world exposed their views on most influencial issues of the current security scenario. Professor Riccardo Redaelli, teaching History of Political Civilties and Cultures and Mr. Daniele Riggio, Information Officer of the NATO public Diplomacy Division, have reported on the current Afghanistan conflict, mostly in quality of direct witnesses of the recently occured in Kabul and nearby.

The research done by Professor de Leonardis on behalf of the Ce.Mi.Ss entitled “NATO: globalization and loss of centrality” has been the main topic of the subsequent round table. The persons who intervened were: Generale Cabigiosu, ex commander of the K-For, Professor AntonGiulio de’ Robertis, teaching History of Treaties at Bari University, Professor Carlo Jean, professor of Strategic Studies at the Link Campus University in Rome and author of the research himself.

The conference continued with an in-depth analysis reguarding the transformation of the force and the military operation of the NATO. Albeit the absence of Professor Ilari, a History of Military Institutions and of Security Systems lecturer at Cattolica, Professor Pastori has read Prof. Ilari’s speech. The reports have occupied the first part of the afternoon: among the speakers we can cite Colonel Massimo Panizzi, Public Affairs Advisor and speaker of the NATO Military Commitee and of the International Military Staff, General Pierpaolo Ramoino, Vice President of the Strategic and International Studies University Centre. A very appreciated speech was the one of the Ambassador Stefanini, permanent reppresentant of Italy at the North-Atlantic Council, who has stressed the importance of the Italian contribution in the process of elaborationg the new Strategic Concept.

The second day started with round table during which Prof. De Leonardis, Ambassador Guido Lenzi, Member of the Board of Directors of the Italian Atlantic Committee, Mr Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, Senior Yellow of the Thomas Moore Institutute in Paris and Prof. Vittorio Emanuele Parsi,Professor of International Relations at the Catholic University exposed their views on the new NATO Strategic Concept.
The conference ended with the exposition of Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero, NATO Deputy Secretary General onthe new NATO, the partnerships with other countries (in particolar Russia)and the future of the Alliance."

NATO Rattles Its Weapons Near Russia’s Borders Again

2010-03-20T01:10:00.002+01:00

Ivan Tulyakov reported to Pravda in Russia about the increasing presence of NATO near the Russian boarders. A point of view...

NATO opened the Baltic Region Training Event – a first in a series of large scale military maneuvers to be held in the Baltic States in 2010. The main goal of the drills is to have Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania integrated into the air policing system of the alliance. Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, France and the United States take part in the event. Poland’s F16, France’s Mirage 2000 and USA’s fueling aircraft, Lithuania’s L39 Albatros will perform joint flights.

The drills are supervised from NATO’s Air Force Headquarters in Rammstein, Germany. An official statement from the headquarters said that the air drills in the Baltic region was a demonstration of NATO’s unity.

NATO started holding drills in the Baltic region in 2008. This year, NATO will organize several drills in the region to train the delivery and deployment of NATO troops.

The maneuvers of 2010 will be the largest since the time when the three Baltic States joined NATO.

Who needs military activities near Russia’s borders? NATO officials claim that the alliance does not threaten Russia, but it seems that Brussels sticks to the same doctrines, for which the military bloc was created.

Some experts believe that NATO organized the drills in response to Russia’s demonstration of force in the war with Georgia. Russia has also conducted joint drills with Belarus, which could also make NATO remind Russia of its presence in the region.

It is obvious, though, that NATO holds the event in the region to strengthen the sanitary cordon with Russia and show Russia who is the master in the Baltic States.

The current and future maneuvers held near the borders of Russia and Belarus can be explained with the development of a certain defense plan for the Baltic States, which is something that the countries wanted to obtain from the alliance. An official spokesman for Estonia’s defense ministry said that the ministry was working on such a plan.

It goes without saying that defense is extremely important. However, it is important only if there is danger of military threat. Russia does not post any threat to the Baltic States, although the leaders of these countries refer to the Georgian experience. Such a reference is politically incorrect and cynical. Georgia was internationally recognized as the aggressor in the war of 2008.

Ivan Tulyakov
Pravda.Ru

Invitation DAYS 2010 - July 5-11

2010-03-17T15:13:00.002+01:00

Dear colleagues in the YATA network

The Danish ATA is proud to announce the 25th annual Danish Atlantic Youth Seminar (DAYS) which will be held on July 5-11 at Aalborg Airbase in the Northern part of Denmark.

DAYS is an event gathering students, experts and practitioners from more than twenty different countries to a week with security politics, conflict management, networking and socialization.
Through lectures, workshops, panel debates and social activities the seminar will give the participants a unique opportunity to enlarge their intellectual and cultural horizon.

All applicants are welcome to contact our project coordinator Emma Hjernø at emma@atlant.dk
for further information. The invitation and application form can be found at our home page www.atlant.dk/days.html
Your application should be send no later than April 15th.

We hope to hear from you soon.

SIMOTAN V - Announcement and Invitation - May 5-8 2010

2010-03-14T23:54:00.005+01:00

Dear Esteemed Friends and Colleagues,

The Portuguese Atlantic Committee and the School of Social and Political Sciences of the Technical University of Lisbon have the immense pleasure of inviting your association to participate in SIMOTAN V, a North Atlantic Council simulation, which will take place in Lisbon, Portugal, from May 5 to May 8.

We kindly ask all candidates to contact us at secretariadoajpa@gmail.com so we can provide you with the Invitation and Appllication Form, to be sent no later than March 31st.

Looking forward to hearing from you soon.